My goal is to pull together some resources in epistemology. I have very limited time for maintaining this page, so it is bound to be very incomplete. Hopefully, though, there will be enough material here for the page to be somewhat useful to those interested in epistemology.

When I started using hit meters on this page, I became aware of the fact that this page gets a lot of internet traffic, much of it apparently from surfers who are referred here from Google searches, mainly on the term "epistemology." I suspect many of those surfers are looking for more basic information than I provide here.  Indeed, many are probably seeking a fairly basic answer to the question "What is epistemology?", and/or basic introductory material on what the main topics in the field are, while this page is intended as a research aid for those who already have a pretty good idea of what epistemology is.
So, for those looking for more basic information, see: What Is Epistemology?  A Brief Introduction to the Topic.

Also On-Line: Contextualism in Epistemology - A Bibliography.  .

Contents:

1. Collections and anthologies

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Around the turn of the century (and of the millennium), a few collections of epistemology papers came out, which provided excellent entries into the field.  These collections are now several years old, and so no longer provide such a cutting-edge-recent introductions to what's going on now in epistemology.  But keeping in mind that one will have to also investigate what's been happening in the last few years, these are still useful enough for students interested in the field that I will list them here.

-Philosophical Perspectives is an annual which is on a different topic every year; 1999 was epistemology's turn (vol. 13).  This volume has many papers, many of them by the "usual suspects" in the field.  A student who wanted to get up on the recent state of epistemology (at least as of 1999) would do well to start with this volume, find some topics that interested her, and then trace the trail of citations back to find other literature on those topics.  Blackwell Publishers now includes Philosophical Perspectives as a supplement to their journal Noûs.  To view the contents or to order, see Blackwell's site here, or you can order through Amazon.com by clicking here.

-Another good entry to the field is the Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (1999).  The editors of that volume, John Greco and Ernest Sosa, commisioned various epistemologists to write seventeen "survey articles," each one on a major area of epistemology.  But in addition to describing the current state of each sub-field, each article also sought to advance the topic.  The description on the Blackwell web page: "Each essay in the volume incorporates background material serving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic; as well as new material by a leading author in the field."  (Barnes & Noble.com, Amazon.com)

-Another collection of recent work in epistemology is the Epistemology volume (volume 5) of the Proceedings of 20th World Congress of Philosophy.

-Vol. 10 (2000) of Philosophical Issues is on Skepticism.

-Vol. 14 (2004) of  Philosophical Issues is on epistemology generally.

And here are some not-so-recent-but not-all-that-old collections:

• Philosophical Topics 23 (1995).
• Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988).
• Philosophical Topics 14 (1986).
• Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980).

The above were all collections of previously unpublished papers.  The following are recent (you'll be hard-pressed to find undergrads younger than these collections) anthologies of previously published epistemology papers.

• L. Alcoff, ed., Epistemology: The Big Questions (Blackwell Publishers, 1998).
• S. Bernecker, F. Dretske, ed., Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2000).
• K. DeRose and T. Warfield, ed., Skepticism (Oxford UP, 1999).
• M. Huemer, ed., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002)
• P. Ludlow, N. Martin, ed., Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications, 1998).
• H. Kornblith, ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Blackwell Publishers, 2001).
• L. Pojman, Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 3rd ed. (Wadsworth, 2003).
• E. Sosa, J. Kim, ed., Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

Finally, teachers of introductory epistemology classes often like to teach from an epistemology textbook.  As it happens, I haven't taught a beginning epistemology class in quite a few years, and even when I did teach such a course, I taught from an anthology, so I can't really speak to which are the better textbooks.  But here are some that have been suggested to me (hopefully, I'll be able to get links up to them soon):

Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 2003).

Laurence BonJour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell, 1985).

Richard Feldman, Epistemology (Prentice Hall, 2003).

Stephen Hetherington, Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology (Westview Press, 1996).

Charles Landesman, An Introduction to Epistemology (Blackwell, 1997).

Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Westview Press, 1990).

Adam Morton, A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Blackwell, 2002).

Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed., (Wadsworth, 2001).

John Pollack, Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd Ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

Matthias Steup, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Prentice-Hall, 1996).

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2. Some Epistemology courses with Syllabi / Helpful Information On-Line:

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3. Graduate Programs strong in epistemology -- updated April '06

First of all, instead of asking me, you should check out Brian Leiter's Philosophical Gourmet Report, which is a good resource for anyone interested in graduate work in philosophy.  Particularly helpful is Leiter's "Breakdown of Programs by Specialties" which, for many particular areas of philosophy, including epistemology, ranks departments by how strong they are in that area.  In the previous (2002-04) PGR, those area evaluations were arrived at through e-mail discussions of the members of the PGR advisory board that worked in the area in question.  This time around (2004-06), the area rankings were determined by a survey of experts in the field -- where the group of experts was quite a bit broader than just the advisory board members that did the rankings last time around.  Here are the top 6 in epistemology, according to the PGR: Rutgers is listed all by itself in Group 1, Oxford is listed by itself in Group 2, and in Group 3 we find (listed alphabetically) Brown, New York University, Princeton, and U of Notre Dame.  Those results seemed fairly sound to me when they came out.  (Follow the link above to see the rest of the departments that get ranked below those 6.)  But there have been significant changes since the latest PGR came out.  Here are some further thoughts about the relevant departments, and also some discussion of the impact of recent changes. 

Boasting several very prominent epistemologists on its faculty, Rutgers was well-chosen as the top program in epistemology.  Alvin Goldman, Peter Klein, Ernest Sosa, and Stephen Stich constitute a formidable line-up of senior epistemologists.  Additionally, and importantly, Rutgers also has several excellent faculty members who, though epistemology is not their main area of research, have done or do good work in the area: Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, Brian McLaughlin, and Jason Stanley.  A graduate student could easily put together an outstanding dissertation committee for a wide variety of dissertation topics in epistemology at Rutgers.  However, since the last PGRs, there have been several changes in Rutgers's faculty, the net effect of which are probably a bit to the negative side for epistemology.  First, the positive: On the faculty lists on which the last PGRs were based, Sosa was listed as part-time at Rutgers because he was splitting time between Brown and Rutgers, but, as reported here, Sosa will be moving to full-time at Rutgers, beginning in January 2007.  Now the negative: First, as reported here, Colin McGinn has left Rutgers for the University of Miami.  McGinn was not primarily an epistemologist, but he had done some prominent work in the area.  Second, as reported here, John Hawthorne is leaving Rutgers.  Actually, this might not hurt Rutgers relative to the last PGRs as much as one might initially think, because, while Hawthorne was on Rutgers's faculty list for the last PGRs, much of his reputation in epistemology is based on recent work that has come out since those surveys were done -- especially his book, Knowledge and Lotteries.   It's hard to measure the net effect of those changes, but my best guess is that it all works out to a slight negative for Rutgers.  But though the negative effect, if any, is slight, Rutgers's standing as the by-themselves-tops in epistemology is more questionable than it was when the last PGRs were done because their loss of Hawthorne was to their chief rival in epistemology...

Oxford University features Timothy Williamson, one of the world's top epistemologists and author of Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford UP, 2000), one of the best and most important books in epistemology in recent years.  (In fact, in my view, that's a bit of an understatement: I'm on record as saying KAIL is the best book in epistemology to come out since 1975.)  Also at Oxford is Ralph Wedgwood who has written some excellent papers in epistemology, and several other faculty who have episemology as an area of interest.  And now John Hawthorne will be going to Oxford.  Adding another prominent epistemologist helps Oxford quite a bit in the area -- and helps them a lot more than it hurts Rutgers, since Rutgers still has many top epistemologists left even after Hawthorne's departure.  Will the result of all the changes be that Oxford moves up into Group 1, along with Rutgers?  That's hard for me to predict.  When I had learned of Hawthorne's deciding to go to Oxford, but had not yet heard of Sosa's moving to full-time status as Rutgers, my very tentative guess was that there would be such a co-grouping.  Now, with Sosa's change in status, I'm more uncertain than ever.

NYU will probably (and should probably) be moving ahead of the other programs they were listed along with in Group 3 of the last PGRs, with the possible exception of Notre Dame.  Their epistemology team is anchored by three excellent senior epistemologists, Paul Bogghossian, Richard Foley, and James Pryor.  Foley is serving as a Dean at NYU, as well as being a member of the philosophy department, so there is no doubt very stiff competition for his time and energy.  (A look at Foley's recent publishing record, however, shows that he has remained very active in his epistemological writing, despite his duties as Dean.)  But Pryor has been added since the last PGRs, coming to NYU from Princeton, as reported here.  This is big boost to NYU in epistemology, as Pryor is one of the most prominent of the younger-tenured epistemologists.  NYU also has Crispin Wright listed on their web page as a "regular visitor," but he probably shouldn't count too much because my PGR survey has him listed as only quarter-time at NYU.  Importantly, NYU also has some other outstanding philosophers who, though epistemology might not be among their current main area of research, would be very good to work with there.  Peter Unger, though he now works mainly in other areas, used to be primarily an epistemologist (and an excellent one, too: there's a reason why I picked 1975 as the year since which Williamson's KAIL is the best epistemology book: I'd pick Unger's '75 skeptical treatise, Ignorance, as the best book in epistemology since I-don't-know(!)-when).  And, very notably, Roger White has done some excellent recent work in epistemology.  In fact, White's recent work has been tending toward epistemology enough that he should perhaps be counted as among NYU's excellent epistemologists, and not just as an excellent philosopher who occasionally works in the area.  And there are several other faculty members at NYU whom I think it would be very exciting to work with in epistemology.  Hartry Field's important work often takes him deeply into epistemological territory, and he could be an excellent guide to some of this territory.  And, though they don't list epistemology as one of their areas (at least on NYU's faculty web page), Stephen Schiffer and Thomas Nagel have each done some fairly recent work there. Some may reasonably think that NYU may rival Oxford, or perhaps even Rutgers, in epistemology.  (I should divulge that I may be biased in favor of NYU: My first job was there, and I know some of the people there very well.  Still, I think my advice here is sound.)

Notre Dame's epistemology team is anchored by Alvin Plantinga, whose old (1980s) work in religious epistemology proved to be provocative and important, and whose recent trilogy of books in epistemology -- Warrant: The Current Debate (1993), Warrant and Proper Function (1993), and Warranted Christian Belief (2000) -- constitute one of the major achievments in the field in recent years.  Joining Plantinga recently (but in time for this change to have been already figured into the last PGRs) is Robert Audi, an epistemologist who has done a lot of important work in the area, and who was hired away from Nebraska, and an exciting team of considerably younger tenured epistemologists: Marian David, Michael Depaul, Leopold Stubenberg, and Ted Warfield.

Gilbert Harman and James Pryor were Princeton epistemology's dynamic duo.  With Pryor having left for NYU, look for Princeton to drop noticeably in the next PGR epistemology rankings.  Princeton did hire Tom Kelly away from Notre Dame since the last PGRs, however -- though this was settled in time that Kelly was already on Princeton's faculty list for the most recent PGRs.  Though untenured at this point, Kelly seems to be an excellent young epistemologist with some first-rate papers to his name already. 

Brown, too, should fall very noticeably.  Christopher Hill, an excellent senior epistemologist, remains.  But much of Brown's reputation in the area no doubt derived from the presence of Ernest Sosa, one of the leading epistemologists in the country, who has now moved full-time to Rutgers.  Sosa was already splitting time between Brown and Rutgers when the last PGRs were done, but he was listed normally (rather than part-time) at Brown (and part-time at Rutgers), so Brown is likely to be hurt quite badly by this change.  Also, James Van Cleve, who is not primarily an epistemologist, but who has done some important and excellent work in the area, had been listed as splitting time between Brown and USC, but will now be full-time at USC, as reported here.  Remaining at Brown, however, is Jaegwon Kim, who, like Van Cleve, has done some important work in epistemology, though it isn't his main area.

Fordham University was listed in the most recent PGR epistemology evaluations as one of two programs that, though they were not part of the PGR survey, were programs that in the judgment of the PGR epistemology advisory board ought to be considered by students interested in epistemology -- largely on the strength of the presence of John Greco.  And since that latest PGR, Fordham has added Bryan Frances, much of whose recent work has been in epistemology.  Update 5/11/06: It is now reported that Greco will be leaving Fordham to go to Saint Louis University.  UC-Davis, which has hired Stephen Hartmann and Jonathan Vogel since the last PGR surveys were done, will probably (or at least should probably) be moving into a group with the departments currently listed in Group 5 in epistemology, or possibly with those currently in Group 4. 

For the most part, and unsurprisingly, the top departments in epistemology tend to also be among the top programs overall in philosophy.  Consider the programs that were in the last PGR's top 6 (Groups 1-3) in epistemology.  Rutgers, NYU, Oxford, and Princeton are all good enough overall that they arguably constitute the top 4 philosophy departments in the English-speaking world, and are certainly at least not too far from that; Notre Dame is several slots behind them, and Brown still several more.  For prospective epistemology students, that's both good news and bad.  Good because it's important to go to a program with good over-all strength, and not just one good in your own area of specialization.  Bad because, being among the very top programs, they are no doubt highly selective in admissions and therefore tough to get into.  (Going just by over-all ranking -- and I don't have much else to go by here -- Notre Dame and, even more so, Brown, might be a bit easier to get into than the other four.)  Prospective students interested in epistemology are therefore well-advised to also look into other programs strong in epistemology; see the list of strong programs in the PGR, following the above links.

But in choosing a program for epistemology, whether it's one of the "top 6" mentioned above, or one of the Group 4 or Group 5 programs listed in the PGR, or one of the programs that didn't make the lists, much will depend, of course, on how well your approach, style, and particular interests match up with the faculty at the various programs.  On that score, you might do well to read some of the published papers of the relevant faculty, and find someone whose work interests you.  As a start, you can check out the depatments' and individuals' web sites, to which I've provided some links (in this section, for some of the departments [for other departments, you can use my list of links to philosophy programs with PhD programs], and below for many of the individual epistemologists).  Unfortunately, you will find that, believe it or not, very many philosophers, including very many from departments with graduate programs, don't even bother to post their CVs or a reasonably complete list of publications on-line!  Still, many do, and one can get quite a bit of helpful information on-line. 

Hope this is of some help, future colleagues in epistemology.  Remember that it's just one epistemologist's opinion.  Talk to your adivsors about it.

Epistemologists on the Move.  The following significant moves of epistemologists were announced after the latest PGR rankings, and so weren't taken account of in those rankings:

• George Bealer: Left the University of Texas for Yale University; began at Yale in Fall of '05.
• Michael Bishop: Presently at Northern Illinois, but has accepted an offer to move to Florida State
  
• Bryan Frances: Left Leeds for Fordham; began at Fordham in the Fall of '05
• Tamar Gendler: Will be leaving Cornell to start at Yale in the Fall of '06
• John Greco: Will be leaving Fordham to go to Saint Louis University.
• Stephen Hartmann: Presently at LSE; has accepted an offer to UC-Davis.
  
• John Hawthorne: Presently at Rutgers University, but has accepted an offer at Oxford University.
• Jonathan Kvanvig: Presently at Missouri, but has accepted an offer to go to Baylor.
• Keith Lehrer: Presently at Arizona, has accepted a Resarch Professorship at Miami; some details here.
  
• James Pryor: Left Princeton University for NYU, began at NYU in the Fall of '05.
• Sherrilyn Roush: Presently at Rice, but has accepted an offer to go to UC-Berkeley.
  
• Ernest Sosa: Has been splitting time between Brown and Rutgers, but will be moving to full-time status at Rutgers and leaving Brown, starting January of '07.
• Jonathan Vogel: Presently at Amherst College; has accepted an offer at UC-Davis, to begin there in the Fall of '06.
  

4. Some Epistemologists and Some of Their Epistemological Publications (since 1995)

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This list is far from exhaustive. I add publications and epistemologists willy-nilly as I come across them or as they're suggested to me.  (So if an epistemology paper of yours isn't listed, or if you're an epistemologist who isn't listed, don't conclude that I've looked at your paper, or at you, but judged them or you unworthy to be included in this index.  It may well even be that I did see your paper and loved it, but didn't have my computer handy at the time, and then didn't remember you & your paper when I did get around to revising this page.)  Still, many have e-mailed to tell me that they find this list very helpful, despite its limitations.  Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the list are the links to various epistemologists' homepages, where you can often find a much more complete description of their epistemological (and other) work (including pre-1995 papers). A few epistemologists are listed without any papers listed below their names.  This is because I'm not aware of any epistemology they've published since 1995.  In each such case, they've done important epistemology in the past, so it was worth providing a link to their home page, where one can often find references to those golden oldies.

A . C . F . H . K . M . R . T

• Fred Adams, University of Deleware
• "Tracking Theories of Knowledge," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 11-35.
  
• with M. Clarke, "Resurrecting the Tracking Theories," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 207-221.
• "Knowledge," in Floridi, ed., The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 228-236.
• with M. Clarke, "Toward Saving Nozick from Kripke," in W. Loffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg: The Austrian Wittgenstein Society, 2003).
• "Epistemology," in McHenry, Yagisawa, eds., Reflections on Philosophy, 2nd Edition (Longman Press, 2003), pp. 81-101.
• "Epistemic Engineering Audi-Style," in J. Heil, ed., Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark Carl Overvold (Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), pp. 49-58.
  
• Jonathan Adler, Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center
• "Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio," Pacific  Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 445-458.
  
• "Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 37-52.
• "Reconciling Open-Mindedness and Belief ," Theory and Research in Education 2 (2004): 127-142.
  
• "The Revisability Paradox," Philosophical Forum 34 (2003): 383-389.
• Belief's Own Ethics, MIT Press, 2002.
  
• "Akratic Believing?," Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 1-27.
• with M. Levin, "Is the Generality Problem too General?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 87-97.
• "The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 267-285.
• "Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 891-905.
• "An Overlooked Argument for Epistemic Conservatism," Analysis 56 (1996): 80-84.
• "Transmitting Knowledge," Noûs 30 (1996): 99-111.
• Scott Aikin, Vanderbilt University
• "Modest Evidentialism," forthcoming, International Philosophical Quarterly.
• "Contrastive Self Attribution of Belief," forthcoming, Social Epistemology.
  
• "Who Is Afraid of Epistemology's Regress Problem?", Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 191-217.
• Linda Alcoff, Syracuse University
• ed., Epistemology: The Big Questions (Blackwell, 1999).
• "On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?", Philosophic Exchange 29 (1999): 73-89.
• Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory of Knowledge (Cornell UP, 1996).
• "Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?", Philosophic Exchange 26 (1996): 59-79.
• Robert F. Almeder, Georgia State University
• "Recent Work on Error," Philosophia 27 (1999): 3-58.
• Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy (Open Court, 1998).
• "Carnap and Quine on Empiricism," History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (1997): 349-364.
• "Dretske's Dreadful Question" (pp. 449-457) and "Externalism and Justification" (pp. 465-469), Philosophia 24 (1995).
• William P. Alston, Syracuse University (emeritus)
• "Perception and Representation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 253-289.
  
• "Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief," in M. Peterson, ed., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 135-145.
• "Sellars and the 'Myth of the Given'," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 69-86.
• "Back to the Theory of Appearing," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 181-203.
• "Perceptual Knowledge," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 223-242.
• "What is Distinctive About the Epistemology of Religious Belief?" Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. IV, Philosophies of Religion, Art, and Creativity.
• "Chisholm on the Epistemology of Perception," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (Open-Court 1997).
• "Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith," in J. Jordan, ed., Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
• D.M. Armstrong, University of Sydney
• "A Naturalist Program: Epistemology and Ontology," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 77-89.
• Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame
• "The Epistemic Authority of Testimony and the Ethics of Belief," in A. Chignell and A. Dole, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 175-201.
• "Intellectual Virtue and Epistemic Power," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 3-16.
  
• The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality (Oxford UP, 2001)
• Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge UP, 2000)
• "Self-Evidence," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 205-228.
• "Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 271-302.
•  Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Routledge, 1998).
• Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford, 1997).
• "The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 405-422.
• "Perceptual Experience, Doxastic Practice, and the Rationality of Religious Commitment," Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 1-18.
• Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
• Guy Axtel, University of Nevada, Reno
• “Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology,” Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 331-352.
• "Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues," in Fairweather & Zagzebski, ed., Virtue Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002).
• ed., Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
• "Virtue Theory and the Fact/Value Problem," in Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology.
• "The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of Epistemology," The Monist 81 (1998): 353-370.
• "Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 1-26.
• "Epistemic Virtue-Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology?" The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10 (1996): 172-198.
• Dorit Bar-On , University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
• Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Oxford UP, 2004.
• "Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression," Noûs 38 (2004): 430-455.
• "Avowals and First-Person Privilege" (with D. Long), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 311-335.
• "Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge," Synthese 106 (1996): 139-166.
• George Bealer, Yale University
  
• "The Origins of Modal Error," Dialectica 58 (2004): 11-42.
  
• "Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance," in Gendler, Hawthorne, eds., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 71-125.
• "A Priori Knowledge," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 1-12.
• "A Theory Of The A Priori," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 29-55.
• "The A Priori," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 243-270.
• "Intuition and The Autonomy of Philosophy," in DePaul, Ramsey, eds., Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 201-239.
• "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy" (pp. 121-142) and "A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa" (pp. 163-174), Philosophical Studies 81 (1996).
• "On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge," Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 1-34.
• James R. Beebe, SUNY-Buffalo
  
• "BonJour's Arguments Against Skepticism About the A Priori," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• "Reliabilism and Deflationism," forthcoming), Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
  
• "Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth," forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
• "The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis," Noûs 38 (2004): 177-195.
  
• "Reliabilism, Truetemp and New Perceptual Faculties," Synthese 140 (2004): 307-329.
• "Interpretation and Epistemic Evaluation in Goldman's Descriptive Epistemology," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (2001): 163-186.
  
• Michael Bergmann, Purdue University
• Justification Without Awareness, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2006.
  
• “Reidian Externalism,” in V. Hendricks, D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology (Ashgate Publishing, forthcoming).
  
• “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 419-36.
  
• “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 709-27.
  
• “Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?”, forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• “BonJour’s Dilemma,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements,” forthcoming, The Philosophical Quarterly.
  
• “Externalist Justification Without Reliability,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), 35-60.
• "What's Not Wrong With Foundationalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 161-65 .
  
• "Externalism and Skepticism," Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 159-94. .
• "Deontology and Defeat," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 87-102
• "Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition," Synthese 110 (1997): 399-417.
• Sven Bernecker, University of Manchester
• “Prospects of Epistemic Compatibilism,” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
• Reading Epistemology, Blackwell, forthcoming 2005.
• “Rule-Following Made Easy,” in W. Löffler, P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief (öbv-hpt, 2004): 63-69.
• “Believing That You Know And Knowing That You Believe,” in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge (de Gruyter 2004): 369-376.
• “Impliziert Erinnerung Wissen?”, in T. Grundmann, ed., Erkenntnistheorie (Mentis Verlag 2001): 145-64.
• Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. with Fred Dretske (Oxford University Press 2000).
• “Knowing the World by Knowing One’s Mind,” Synthese 123 (2000): 1-34.
• “Self-Knowledge and Closure,” in P. Ludlow, N. Martin, eds., Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications 1998): 333-349.
• “Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge,” Nous 30 (1996): 262-275.
• “Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism,” Inquiry 39 (1996): 121-139.
  
• Michael A. Bishop, Northern Illinois University --> Florida State University
  
• with J.D. Trout. “The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology,” forthcoming, Nous.
• with J.D. Trout, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Oxford UP, 2005.
• with J.D. Trout, "Epistemology’s Search for Significance," Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15 (2003): 203-216.
• with S. Downes, “The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist or Social Institution,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 33 (2002): 121-136.
• with R. Samuels and S. Stich, “Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Normative Disputes about Cognitive Illusions Disappear,” in R. Elio, ed., Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality, Oxford UP, 2002.
  
• "In Praise of Epistemic Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be?," Synthese 122 (2000): 179-208.
• “Why Thought Experiments are Not Arguments,” Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): 534-541.
• “An Epistemological Role for Thought Experiments,” in N. Shanks, ed., Idealization IX: Idealization in Contemporary Physics, Poznan Studies in Philosophy of Science and Humanities Bookseries, Rodopi, 1998.
  
• Tim Black, California State University, Fresno
• with P. Murphy, “Avoiding the Dogmatic Commitments of Contextualism,” forthcoming, Grazer Philosophische Studien.
• “Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism,” forthcoming in V.F. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology (Ashgate, 2005).
• with P. Murphy, “In Defense of Sensitivity,” forthcoming, Synthese.
• “The Distinction Between Coherence and Constancy in Hume’s Treatise I.iv.2”, forthcoming, The British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
  
• "Classical Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manoeuvres," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 328-336.
• “The Relevant Alternatives Theory and Missed Clues,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 96-106.
• "A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 148-163.
• "Relevant Alternatives and the Shifting Standards for Knowledge," Southwest Philosophy Review18 (2002): 23-32.
• Michael Blome-Tillmann, Oxford University
• "The Indexicality of 'Knowledge'," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  
• "A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism," forthcoming, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
  
• "Coherentism and Foundationalism From A Contextualist Point of View," in W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2003, 42-43.
• "What's Wrong With Sceptical Invariantism?," in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz, eds., Selected Papers Contributed to GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy, Bielefeld, 22-26 September 2003, Paderborn: mentis, 157-68.
  
• Paul Boghossian, New York University
• Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2006.
  
• "Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense," Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (2003): 15-35.
  
• "Blind Reasoning," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 77 (2003): 225-248
• "Inference and Insight," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 633-640
  
• "How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?", Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 1-40.
• edited, with C. Peacocke, New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford UP, 2000.
• "Knowledge of Logic," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 229-254.
• "What the Externalist Can Know A Priori," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1997): 161-175.
• Laurence BonJour, University of Washington, Seattle
• "In Defense of the A Priori," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 98-105.
• "In Search of Direct Realism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 349-367.
  
• with Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
  
• "Four Theses Concerning A Priori Justification," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 13-20.
• "Foundationalism and the External World," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 229-249.
• "The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 117-142.
• In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification, Cambridge UP, 1998.
• "Précis" (pp. 625-631) and "Replies" (pp. 673-698), Symposium on In Defense of Pure Reason, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001).
• "Haack on Justification and Experience," Synthese 112 (1997): 13-23.
• "Plantinga on Knowledge and Proper Function," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 47-71.
• "Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness," Philosophical Studies 78 (1995): 207-220.
• Nick Bostrom, Oxford University
• “The Simulation Argument: Reply to Brian Weatherson,” Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 90-97.
• “Are You Living In A Computer Simulation?”, Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 243-255.
  
• Luc Bovens, London School of Economics and Political Science
• with S. Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
• with S. Hartmann, "Why There Cannot Be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence," forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
• with S. Hartmann, "Coherence and the Role of Specificity: A Response to Meijs and Douven," Mind 114 (2005).
• with E. Olsson, "Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions," Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 137-150.
• with S. Hartmann, "Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments," Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 29-73.
• with S. Leeds, "The Epistemology of Social Facts: The Evidential Value of Personal Experience versus Testimony," in G. Meggle, ed., Social Facts and Collective Intentionality (Frankfurt a.M., 2002).
• with E. Olsson, "Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks," Mind 109 (2000): 685-719.
• with J. Hawthorne, "The Preface, the Lottery and the Logic of Belief," Mind 108 (1999): 241-264.
• "Do Beliefs Supervene on Degrees of Confidence?", in A. Meigers, ed., Belief, Cognition and the Will (Tilburg University Press, 1999).
• "Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998): 79-101.
• "'P and I Will Believe that Not-P': Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief," Mind 104 (1995): 737-760.
• David Braun, University of Rochester
  
• Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations," Nous 34 (2000): 203-236.
  
• "Understanding Belief Reports," Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 555-595..
  
• Bill Brewer, University of Warwick
• "Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 217-230.
• "Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical Facts," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 415-432.
• "Self-Knowledge and Externalism," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 39-47.
• Perception and Reason (Oxford UP, 1999).
• "Précis" (pp. 405-416) and "Replies" (pp. 449-464), Symposium on Perception and Reason, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001).
• "Experience and Reason in Perception" in A. O'Hear, ed., Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge UP, 1998).
• "Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 41-55.
• "Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge," European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996): 259-275.
• "Mental Causation II," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volume 69 (1995): 237-253.
• Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri, St. Louis -- blog: Lemmings.
  
• with J. Salerno, “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle,” forthcoming, American Philosophical Quarterly.
• with J. Salerno, “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” forthcoming in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., New Waves in Epistemology, Ashgate.
• "Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem," Synthese 139 (2004): 367-386.
• "Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 351-370.
• "Adhoccery in Epistemology," Philosophical Papers 32 (2003): 65-82.
• with J. Salerno, "Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant," Analysis 62 (2002): 143-150.
• "Peirce on Abduction and Rational Control," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (1999): 129-155.
  
• Audre Jean Brokes, Saint Josephs's University
• "What Does the Generality Problem Show?", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 145-156.
• Fernando Broncano, University of Salamanca, Spain
• "Reliable Rationality," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 49-59.
• Jessica Brown, University of Bristol
• "Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism?," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 263-285.
• "Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 319-327.
• "Anti-Individualism and Agnosticism," Analysis 61 (2001): 213-224.
• "Critical Reasoning, Understanding and Self-Knowledge", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 659-676.
• "Reliabilism, Knowledge and Mental Content", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 115-135.
• "Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access," Analysis 59 (1999): 52-59.
• "The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access," Analysis 55 (1995): 149-156.
• Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barabara
• "Contexualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 315-318.
• "Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 53-64.
• "Williamson on the Primeness of Knowing," Analysis 62 (2002): 197-202.
• "Anti-Individualism and Analyticity," Analysis 62 (2002): 87-91.
• "Bonjour's A Priori Justification of Induction," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 1-10.
• "A Priori Knowledge of the World Not Easily Available," Philosophical Studies 104 (2001): 109-114.
• "Klein on Closure and Skepticism," Philosophical Studies 98 (2000): 139-151.
• "Externalism and the A Prioricity of Self-Knowledge," Analysis 60 (2000): 132-136.
• "Ambiguity and Knowledge of Content," Analysis 60 (2000): 257-260.
• "Two Recent Approaches to Self-Knowledge," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 251-271.
• "The Super-Omnicient Interpreter," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 526-528.
• "Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism," in R. Stern, ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Oxford UP, 1999.
• "Difficulties in Generating Scepticism about Knowledge of Content," Analysis 59 (1999): 59-63.
• "Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 361-364.
• "Closure and Context," Ratio 11 (1998): 78-82.
• "Externalism and Memory," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997): 1-12.
• "Is Scepticism about Self-Knowledge Incoherent?", Analysis 57 (1997): 287-290.
• "Deontologism and Internalism in Epistemology," Nous 30 (1996): 527-536.
• "Trying to Get Outside Your Own Skin," Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 79-111.
• "Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference," Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 199-201.
• Tyler Burge, University of California, Los Angeles
• "Perceptual Entitlement," Philosophy and Phenomonelogical Research 67 (2003): 503-548
• "Frege on Apriority," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 11-42.
• "A Century of Deflation and a Moment About Self-Knowledge," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 25-46.
• "Frege on Knowing the Foundation," Mind 107 (1998): 305-347.
• "Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds," Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998).
• "Interlocution, Perception, and Memory," Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 21-47.
• "Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 91-116.
• "Frege on Knowing the Third Realm" in Schirn, ed., Frege: Importance and Legacy (De Gruyter, 1996)
• Panayot Butchvarov, University of Iowa
• Skepticism About the External World (Oxford UP, 1998).
• Keith Butler, Western Washington University
• "Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 773-800.
• Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• "Perception and Conceptual Content," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 231-250.
• "How Hard are the Sceptical Paradoxes?", Noûs 38 (2004): 299-325.
• Joseph Camp, University of Pittsburgh
• Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge, Harvard UP, 2002
• James Cargile, University of Virginia
• "The Fallacy of Epistemicism," forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
  
• "Scepticism and Possibilities," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000).
• "On an Argument against Closure," Nous 33 (1999): 239-246.
• "The Problem of Induction," Philosophy 73 (1998): 247-275.
• "Justification and Misleading Defeaters," Analysis 55 (1995): 216-220.
• Peter Carruthers, University of Maryland
• "Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of Theory-Theory," in P.Carruthers and P.K. Smith, eds.,
• Theories of Theories of Mind (Cambridge UP, 1996), pp. 22-38.
• Quassim Cassam, Oxford University
• "Rationalism, Empiricism, and the A Priori," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 43-64.
• "Mind, Knowledge and Reality: Themes from Kant," in O'Hear, ed., Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge UP, 1998.
• "Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of Misconception," European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996): 276-295.
• Albert Casullo, University of Nebraska
• A Priori Justification, Oxford UP, 2003.
• "Experience and A Priori Justification," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 665-671.
• "The Coherence of Empiricism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 31-48.
• "Modal Epistemology: Fortune or Virtue?," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 17-25.
• "Is Empiricism Coherent?" Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 61-74.
• ed., A Priori Knowledge (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1999).
• "A Priori Knowledge Appraised," in A. Casullo (ed.), A Priori Knowledge (1999).
• David Chalmers, University of Arizona
• "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief," in Q. Smith, A. Jokic, eds., Aspects of Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2003).
• "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler, J. Hawthorne, eds., Imagination, Conceivability, and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002).
• James Chase, University of Tasmania
  
• "Indicator Reliabilism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 115-137.
• "Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification?", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001): 227-246.
• David Christensen, University of Vermont
• Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief, Oxford UP, 2004.
  
• "Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality," Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 349-371.
• "Measuring Evidence," Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 437 - 461.
• "What is Relative Confirmation?" Noûs 31 (1997): 370 - 384.
• (with H. Kornblith) "Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori," Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 1 - 20.
• "Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers,"Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 450-479.
• Critical Study of Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality, Noûs 29 (1995): 259 - 274.
• Murray Clarke, Concordia University, Montreal
• with F. Adams, "Resurrecting the Tracking Theories," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 207-221.
• Reconstructing Reason and Representation, MIT Press, 2004.
• with Fred Adams, "Toward Saving Nozick from Kripke," in W. Loffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg: The Austrian Wittgenstein Society, 2003).
• "Reliabilism and the Meliorative Project," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 75-82.
• "Knowledge and Indexical Representation," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 178 (1996): 53-62.
• Andrew D. Cling, University of Alabama, Huntsville
• "Justification-Affording Circular Arguments," Philosophical Studies 111 (2002): 251-275
• "Epistemic Levels and the Problem of the Criterion," Philosophical Studies 88 (1997): 109-140.
• Lorraine Code, York University
• "Epistemology," in A. Jaggar, ed., A Companion to Feminist Philosophy (Blackwell, 1998).
• "What is Natural About Epistemology Naturalized?", American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 1-22
• E.J. Coffman, University of Notre Dame
• "Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism," forthcoming, Synthese.
• with D. Howard-Snyder, “Three Arguments against Foundationalism,” forthcoming, Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
  
• Jonathan Cohen, University of California, San Diego
• with P. Magnus, "Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation," Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 37-52
• Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University
• "Contextualism Defended," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 56-62.
• "Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 417-430.
• "Knowledge, Speaker and Subject," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 199-212.
• "Structure and Connection: Comments on Sosa's Epistemology," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 17-21.
• "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 309-329.
• "Contextualism and Skepticism," (pp. 94-107) and "Replies [to Klein, Hawthorne, and Prades]" (pp. 132-139), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
• "Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 57-89.
• "Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1999): 1043-1048.
• "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 289-306.
• "Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research58 (1998): 143-159.
• "Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 913-918.
• Juan Comesaña, University of Wisconsin, Madison
• "We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now," forthcoming, Philosophical Perspectives.
  
• "A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem, forthcoming, Philosophical Studies 129 (2006: 27-47.
  
• "Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: A Case Against Disjunctivism," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Unsafe Knowledge," Synthese 146 (2005):  395-404.
  
• "The Diagonal and the Demon," Philosophical Studies 100 (2002): 249-266.
• Earl Conee, University of Rochester
• "Contextualism Contested," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 47-56.
• with R. Feldman, "Some Virtues of Evidentialism," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 95-108.
• with R. Feldman, Evidentialism, Oxford UP, 2004.
• with R. Feldman, "Typing Problems" (a response to Adler and Levin's "Is the Generality Problem too General?"), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 98-105
• with R. Feldman, "Internalism Defended," American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001):
• "Seeing the Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998).
• with R. Feldman, "The Generality Problem for Reliabilism," Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 1-29.
• "Plantinga's Naturalism," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 183-196.
• Josep E. Corbi, Universitat de Valencia
• "The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 377-385.
• Edward Craig, University of Cambridge
• "Response to Lehrer ['s "Discursive Knowledge"]," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 655-665.
• Thomas Crisp, Biola University
• "Hawthorne on Knowledge and Practical Reasoning," Analysis 65 (2005): 138-140.
• "Gettier and Plantinga's Revised Account of Warrant," Analysis 60 (2000): 42-50.
• Joseph Cruz, Williams College
• with John Pollock, "The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism," in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (New York: de Gruyter, forthcoming).
• with John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd Edition (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
• Jonathan Dancy, University of Reading
• "Arguments from Illusion," Philosophical Quarterly 45(1995): 421-438.
• "Supervenience, Virtues and Consequences: A Commentary on Knowledge in Perspective by Ernest Sosa," Philosophical Studies 78 (1995):189-205.
• Charles B. Daniels, University of Victoria
• "A Theism-Free Cartesian Analysis of Knowledge," Noûs 33 (1999): 201-213
• Marian David, University of Notre Dame
• "Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 296-312.
• "Truth as the Epistemic Goal," in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty (Oxford UP, 2001)
• "Two Conceptions of the Synthetic A Priori," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (Open Court, 1997).
  
• Martin Davies, Australian National University
• "Externalism and Armchair Knowledge," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 384-414.
• "Self-Knowledge, Armchair Knowledge, and Knowledge by Inference," forthcoming, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. V, Epistemology.
• "Externalism, Architectuaralism, and Epistemic Warrant," in McDonald, Smith and Wright, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge (Oxford UP, 1998).
• Wayne A. Davis, Georgetown University
• "Concepts and Epistemic Individuation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 290-325.
  
• Michael DePaul, University of Notre Dame
• "Truth Consequentialism, Withholding and Proportioning Belief to the Evidence," Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 91-112.
• ed., with L. Zagzebski, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Clarendon Press, 2003.
• "Value Monism in Epistemology," in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Oxford UP, 2001.
• ed., Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism, Rowman and Littledfield, 2000.
  
• "Linguistics is Not a Good Model for Philosophy," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 113-120.
• ed., with W. Ramsey, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
• "Why Bother with Reflective Equilibrium?", DePaul, Ramsey, ed., Rethinking Intuition, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
• Graciela De Pierris, Indiana University
• "Philosophical Scepticism in Wittgenstein's On Certainty" in R. Popkin, ed., Scepticism in the History of Philosophy: A Pan-American Dialogue (Kluwer, 1996)
• Michael Della Rocca, Yale University
• "Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 1-33.
• Keith DeRose, Yale University
• "'Bamboozled by Our Own Words': Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  
• "Direct Warrant Realism," in A. Dole and A. Chignell, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 150-172.
  
• "The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 172-198.
• "Single Scoreboard Semantics," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 1-21.
• "Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 22-41.
• "The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (2004): 346-350.
• "Assertion, Knowledge and Context," Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 167-203.
• "Now You Know It, Now You Don't," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 91-106.
• "How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats?" The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
• "Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 697-706.
• "Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?" Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 385-413
• "Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 187-205.
• ed., with T. Warfield, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford UP, 1999).
• "Responding to Skepticism," in DeRose and Warfield, ed., Skepticism (1999), pp. 1-24.
• "Simple Might's, Indicative Possibilities, and the Open Future," The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 67-82.
• "Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 568-580.
• "Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): pp. 193-197.
• "Solving the Skeptical Problem," Philosophical Review 104 (1995): pp. 1-52.
• Michael Devitt, City University of New York, Graduate Center
• "No Place for the A Priori," forthcoming in M.J. Shaffer and M. Veber, eds., New Views of the A Priori in Physical Theory, Rodopi Press.
  
• "There Is no A Priori," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 105-115.
• "Underdetermination and Realism," Philosophical Issues 12 (2002): 26-50.
• "Naturalism and the A Priori," Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 45-65.
  
• Fred Dretske, Stanford University (emeritus)
• "The Case Against Closure," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 13-26.
• Perception, Knowledge, and Belief : Selected Essays (Cambridge UP, 2000).
• ed., with S. Bernecker, Knowledge : Readings in Contemporary Epistemology(Oxford UP, 2000).
• "Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 591-606.
• "The Mind's Awareness of Itself," Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 103-124.
• "Absent Qualia," Mind and Language 11 (1996): 78-85.
• "Phenomenal Externalism" and "Reply to Commentators, " in E. Villanueva, ed., Perception (Ridgeview, 1996)
• "Dretske's Awful Answer," Philosophia 24 (1995): 459-464.
• "Introspection," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1994): 263-278.
• Gary Ebbs, University of Illionois, Urbana
• "Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent?," Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 43-58.
• Jim Edwards, University of Glasgow
• "Burge on Testimony and Memory," Analysis 60 (2000): 124-131.
• Catherine Elgin, Harvard University (School of Education)
• "Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 156-167.
• "Take It from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 291-308.
• Considered Judgment, Princeton UP, 1996.
• "Unnatural Science," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 289-302.
• Mylan Engel, Nothern Illinois University
• “Internalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (2000).
• Pascal Engel, University of Paris-Sorbonne
• "The Norms of Thought: Are They Social?," Mind and Society 2 (2002): 129-148.
• "Dispositional Belief, Assent and Acceptance," Dialectica 53 (1999): 211-226.
• "Volitionism and Voluntarism about Belief," in A. Meijers, ed., Belief, Cognition and the Will (Tilburg University Press, 1999), pp. pages 9-25.
• "Believing, Accepting, and Holding True," Philosophical Explorations 1 (1998).
  
• Theodore J. Everett, SUNY, Geneseo
• "The Rationality of Science and the Rationality of Faith," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 19-42.
• Simon Evnine, University of Miami
• "Epistemic Unities," Erkenntnis 59 (2003): 365-88.
  
• “The Universality of Logic: On the Connection between Rationality and Logical Ability,” Mind 110 (2001): 335-67
• "Learning from One's Mistakes: Epistemic Modesty and the Nature of Belief," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 157-177.
• “Believing Conjunctions,” Synthese 118 (1999): 201-227.
• Evan Fales, University of Iowa
• "Proper Basicality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 373-383.
• "Does Religion Experience Justify Religious Belief?: Do Mystics See God?" in M. Peterson, ed., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 145-158.
• critical study of Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, Nous 37 (2003): 353-370.
  
• A Defense of the Given, Rowman and Littlefield, 1996.
• "Mystical Experience as Evidence," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (1996): 19-46.
• "Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology," Philosophy of Science 63 (1996): 432-451.
• Kevin Falvey, University of California, Santa Barbara
• "Memory and Knowledge of Content", in S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT Press, 2003).
• "The Basis of First Person Authority," Philosophical Topics 28 (2000): 69-99.
  
• "Knowledge in Intention," Philosophical Studies 99 (2000): 21-44.
• "The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access," Analysis 60 (2000): 137-142.
• "A Natural History of Belief," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 324-345.
• Jeremy Fantl, University of Calgary
  
• with Matthew McGrath, "Knowledge and the Purely Epistemic: A Defense of Pragmatic Encroachment," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "An Analysis of the A Priori and A Posteriori," Acta Analytica 18 (2003): 43-69.
• "Modest Infinitism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 537-562.
  
• with Robert Howell, "Sensations, Swatches, and Speckled Hens," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 371-383.
  
• with Matthew McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 67-94.
  
• Paul Faulkner, University of Sheffield
• "An Epistemic Role of Trust", in Falcone, Barber, Singh, and Korba, L., ed., Trust, Reputation and Security: Theories and Practice (Springer forthcoming).
• "On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony," Synthese 131 (2002): 353-370.
• "The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 581-601.
• "Testimonial Knowledge," Acta Analytica 15 (2000).
• "David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998).
• Neil Feit, SUNY, Fredonia
• "Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 29-55.
• Richard Feldman, University of Rochester
• "Justification Is Internal," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 270-284.
• with E. Conee, "Some Virtues of Evidentialism," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 95-108.
• with E. Conee, Evidentialism, Oxford UP, 2004.
• "Foundational Justification," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 42-58.
• with E. Conee, "Typing Problems" (a response to Adler and Levin's "Is the Generality Problem too General?"), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 98-105.
• "Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions," Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 61-85.
• with E. Conee, "Internalism Defended," American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 1-18.
• "Kvanvig on Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 43-50.
• "Epistemology, Argumentation, and Citizenship," forthcoming, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. 3, pp. 89-106.
• "The Ethics of Belief," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 667-695.
• "Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 170-186.
• "Contextualism and Skepticism," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 91-114.
• with E. Conee, "The Generality Problem for Reliabilism," Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 1-29.
• "Plantinga, Gettier, and Warrant," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 199-220.
• "In Defense of Closure," Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 487-494.
• "Authoritarian Epistemology," Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 147-170.
• Hartry Field, New York University
• "Recent Debates about the A Priori," forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
• "Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle," Noûs 34 (2000): 1-30.
• "Apriority as an Evaluative Notion," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 117-149.
• "Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic," Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 1-24.
• "The A Prioricity of Logic," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 359-379.
• Kit Fine, New York University
• "Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects," forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
• Branden Fitelson, University of California, Berkeley
• “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation,” forthcoming, Synthese.
• with A. Waterman, “Bayesianism and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens,” forthcoming, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
• with Jim Hawthorne, “Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence, Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 505–514.
• “A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence,” Analysis 63 (2003): 194–199.
• with D. Bradley, “Monty Hall, Doomsday, and Confirmation,” Analysis 63 (2003): 23–31.
• “Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction,” Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 611–622.
• with E. Eells, “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 129–142.
• with L. Bovens, S. Hartmann, J. Snyder, “Too Odd (not) to Be True? A Reply to Erik J. Olsson: ‘Corroborating Testimony,
  Probability and Surprise’,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 539–563.
• “A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications” Philosophy of Science 68 (2001): S123–40.
• with E. Eells, “Measuring Confirmation and Evidence,” Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 121–232.
• “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity,” Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): S362–78.
• with E. Sober, “Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998) 115–29. Reprinted in R. Pennock, ed., Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics, MIT Press.
• “Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity,” Philosophy of Science 63 (1996): 652–60.
  
• Robert Fogelin, Dartmouth College
• "Contextualism and Externalism: Trading in One Form of Skepticism for Another" (pp. 43-57) and "Replies [to Rosenberg, Villanueva, Valdes-Villanueva, and Williams]" (pp. 86-93), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
• "The Sceptic's Burden," International Journal of Philosophical Studies (1999): 159-172.
• "Garrett on the Consistency of Hume's Philosophy," Hume Studies 24 (1998): 161-169.
• "Quine's Limited Naturalism," Journal of Philosophy (1997): 543-563.
• "Prècis" (pp. 395-400) and "What Does a Pyrrhonist Know?" (replies to Dretske, Moser, Stroud, pp. 417-425); Symposium on R. Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997).
• Richard Foley, New York University
• "Justified Belief as Responsible Belief," in M. Steup and E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 313-326.
• "A Trial Separation between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 59-71.
• "Three Attempts to Refute Skepticism and Why They Fail" in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 61-73.
  
• Intellectual Trust in Ourselves and Others, Cambridge UP, 2001.
  
• "Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible Belief," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 181-188.
• "Locke and the Crisis of Postmodern Epistemology," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 1-20.
• "Rationality and Intellectual Self-Trust," in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, ed., Rethinking Intuition (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
• "Chisholm's Epistemology," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers (Open Court, 1997): 475-498.
• "Knowledge is Accurate and Comprehensive Enough True Belief," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 87-95.
• Graeme Forbes, University of Colorado, Boulder
  
• "Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 205-222.  Reprinted in Skepticism (DeRose and Warfield, 1999).
• Bryan Frances, Fordham University
• Scepticism Comes Alive, forthcoming, Oxford UP, 2005.
• "When a Sceptical Hypothesis is Live," Noûs 39 (2005): 559-595.
  
• "A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription," Analysis 62 (2002): 116-124.
• "Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles," Mind and Language 14 (1999): 203-226.
  
• Elizabeth Fricker, Oxford University
• "Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism is the Epistemology of Testimony," Mind 104 (1995): 393-411.
• Michael Friedman, Indiana University
• "Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge: A Neo-Kantian Perspective," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 367-383.
• Richard Fumerton, University of Iowa
• "The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 85-97.
• "Achieving Epistemic Ascent," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 72-85.
• "Mill's Epistemology and Metaphysics" in The Modern Philosophers: From Descartes to Nietzche (Blackwell, forthcoming).
• "Epistemic Justification and Normativity," in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Obligation: Essays on Epistemic Responsibility and the Ethics of Belief, (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
• "Classical Foundationalism" and "Response" in M. DePaul, ed., Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism (Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).
• "Relational, Non-Relational, and Mixed Theories of Experience," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 21-28.
• "Williamson on Skepticism and Evidence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 629-635.
• "Externalism and Epistemological Direct Realism," The Monist 81 (1998): 393- 406.
• Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
• "Prècis" (pp. 905-907) and "A Reply to my Critics" (pp. 927-938), Symposium on R. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998).
• André Gallois, Syracuse University
• "The Indubitability of the Cogito," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 363-384.
• The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority, Cambridge UP, 1996
• with John Hawthorne, "Externalism and Scepticism," Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 1-26, January 1996.
• Alfonso Garcia Suarez, Universidad de Oviedo
• "On Wright's Diagnosis of McKinsey's Argument," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 164-171.
• Tamar Szabo Gendler, Yale University
  
• ed., with J. Hawthorne, Perceptual Experience (Oxford UP, 2006).
  
• with J. Hawthorne, "The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for your Epistemic Enemies," Philosophical Studies 124 (2005): 331-352.
  
• "Thought Experiments Rethought -- and Reperceived," Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 1152-1163.
  
• "On the Relation Between Pretense and Belief," in D.M. Lopes and M. Kieran, ed., Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts, (Routledge, 2003), pp. 125-141.
• ed., with J. Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002).
• “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” The Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 55-81.
• Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases, Outstanding Dissertations in Philosophy, Garland Press (now Routledge), 2000. (70,000 words)
• "Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1998): 397-424.
• "On the Possibility of Feminist Epistemology," Metaphilosophy 27 (1996): 104-117.
• Brie Gertler, University of Virginia
  
• “We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know that water does?”, Analysis, 64 (2004) : 44-47
  
• ed., Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (Ashgate, 2003).
• “Can Feminists be Cartesians?”, Dialogue 41 (2002): 91-112.
• "Introspecting Phenomenal States," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 305-328.
• "The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge," Philosophical Topics 28 (2001): 125-46.
• Edmund Gettier, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
• John Gibbons, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
• "Access Externalism," Mind 115 (2006): 19-39.
  
• "Knowledge in Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 579-600.
• "Externalism and Knowledge of the Attitudes," Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 13-28.
• "Externalism and Knowledge of Content," Philosophical Review 105 (1996): 287-310.
• Anthony Gillies, University of Michigan
• "New Foundations for Epistemic Change," Synthese. 138 (2004): 1-48.
  
• "Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics," Noûs 38 (2004): 585-615.
• "A New Solution to Moore's Paradox," Philosophical Studies 105 (2001):  237-250.
• "Belief Revision and Epistemology" (with John Pollock), Synthese 122 (2000): 69-92.
• Carl Ginet, Cornell University (emeritus)
• "Infinitism Is not the Solution to the Regress Problem," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 140-149.
• "The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 267-277.
  
• Sanford Goldberg, University of Kentucky
• editor, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
• "Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification," forthcoming, Noûs.
• "Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discrimination," forthcoming, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
• with D. Henderson, "Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge," forthcoming in J. Lackey and E. Sosa, eds., The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford UP).
• "Testimonial Knowledge from Unsafe Testimony," Analysis 65 (2005): 302-311.
• "The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2005): 135-148.
• "(Non-standard) Lessons from World-Switching Cases," Philosophia 32 (2005): 95-131.
• "Radical Interpretation, Understanding, and Testimonial Transmission," Synthese 138 (2004): 387-416.
• "Anti-individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism," Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 53-78.
• "On our Alleged A Priori Knowledge that Water Exists," Analysis 63 (2003): 38-41.
  
• "What Do You Know When You Know Your Own Thoughts?," in S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 241-56.
• "Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of the Attitudes Capture the Agents' Conceptions?," Noûs 36 (2002): 597-621.
  
• "Belief and Its Linguistic Expression: Towards a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority," Philosophical Psychology 15 (2002): 65-76
• "Testimonially Based Knowledge From False Testimony," Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 512-526
• "Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy," Philosophical Studies 100 (2000): 51-79.
• "The Semantics of Interlocution," Communication and Cognition 33 (2000): 249-286
• "The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 136-156.
• "The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge," Synthese 118 (1999): 165-199.
• "Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Knowledge of Content: Reply to Brueckner," Analysis 59 (1999): 212-217.
• "Self-Ascription, Self-Knowledge, and the Memory Argument," Analysis 57 (1997): 211-219.
• "The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception," Minds and Machines 7 (1997): 515-529.
• Alan Goldman, College of William and Mary
• Epistemological Foundations: Can Experiences Justify Beliefs?," American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004): 273-285.
  
• Alvin I. Goldman, Rutgers University
• Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Oxford UP, 2006.
  
• "Sosa on Reflective Knowledge and Virtue Perspectivism," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 86-95.
• "Group Knowledge versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology," Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 1 (2004): 11-22.
• Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public (Oxford UP, 2002)
• "Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 85-110.
• "The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues," in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski, eds., Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (Oxford UP, 2001).
• "Social Routes to Belief and Knowledge," The Monist (2001).
• "Veritistic Social Epistemology," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 107-114.
• Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford, 1999).
• "Précis" (pp. 185-190) and "Replies" (pp. 215-227), Symposium on Knowledge in a Social World, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002).
• "Internalism Exposed," Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 271-293
• "A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology," Philosophical Perspectives13 (1999): 1-28.
• "Argumentation and Interpersonal Justification," Argumentation 11(1997): 155-164.
• "Social Epistemology, Interests, and Truth," Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 171-187.
• Peter Graham, University of California, Riverside
• "Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential?," The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 84-95.
  
• "The Reliability of Testimony," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 695-709.
• "Transferring Knowledge," Noûs 34 (2000): 131-152
• "Conveying Information," Synthese 123 (2000): 365-392.
• "What is Testimony?", Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997): 227-232.
• John Greco, Fordham University
• "Justification Is not Internal," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 257-270.
• ed., Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, 2004.
• "How to Preserve Your Virtue while Losing Your Perspective," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 96-105.
• Putting Skeptics in Their Place (Cambridge UP, 2000).
• "Skepticism, Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 139-147.
• "Scepticism and Epistemic Kinds," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 366-376.
• "Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue" (contribution to book symposium for Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000).
• "Agent Reliabilism," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 273-296.
• ed., with E. Sosa, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999).
• "The Force of Hume's Skepticism about Unobserved Matters of Fact," Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998): 289-306.
• "Foundationalism and Philosophy of Religion," in Brian Davies, ed., Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject (London: Cassell, 1998), pp. 34-41.
• "Catholics vs. Calvinists on Religious Knowledge," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1997): 13-34.
• "Modern Ontology and the Problems of Epistemology," American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995): 241-251.
• "Reid's Critique of Berkeley and Hume: What's the Big Idea?," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 279-296.
• Patrick Greenough, University of St. Andrews
• Tobies Grimaltos, Universitat de Valencia
• (with Carlos J. Moya) "Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 386-394.
• Stephen Grimm, University of Notre Dame
• "Ernest Sosa, Knowledge, and Understanding," Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 171-191.
• Susan Haack, University of Miami
• "A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification," in L. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge, second edition (Wadsworth, 1998): 283-293; also in E. Sosa and J. Kim, ed., Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2000): 226-236.
• "The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, 1997.
• "The Puzzle of 'Scientific Method'," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (1997): 495-505.
• "The First Rule of Reason," in P. Forster, ed., The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, U Toronto Press, 1997.
• "Reflections of a Critical Common-sensist," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 32 (1996): 359-373.
• Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Blackwell, 1995
• "Prècis of Evidence and Inquiry" (pp. 7-11) and "Reply to Bonjour" (pp. 25-35), Synthese 112 (1997).
• "Prècis" (pp. 611-614) and "Reply to Commentators" (pp. 641-656), Symposium on S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996).
• Alan Hájek, Australian National University
  
• "Induction and Probability" (with Ned Hall), in Machamer and Silberstein, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Science (Blackwell, 2002).
• "Crimmins, Gonzales and Moore" (with Daniel Stoljar), Analysis 61 (2001): 208-213.
• "Agnosticism Meets Bayesianism," Analysis 58 (1998): 199-206.
• "Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen" (with William Harper), Dialogue 36 (1997): 91-100.
• Bob Hale, University of Glasgow
• with C. Wright, "Implicit Definition and the A Priori," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 286-319.
• "Transmission and Closure," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 172-190.
• Steven Hales, Bloomsburg University
• "The Problem of Intuition," American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2000): 135-147.
• "Epistemic Closure Principles," Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1995): 185-201.
• Richard J. Hall, Michigan State University
• "The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence" (with Charles Johnson), American Philosophical Quarterly, April, 1998.
• Gilbert Harman, Princeton University
• "Skepticism and Foundations," in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 1-11.
  
• "The Future of the A Priori," in Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century, APA Centennial Supplement to Journal of Philosophical Research (Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2003), pp. 23-34.
• "Reflections on Knowledge and its Limits," Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 417-428.
• "Rational Insight versus General Foundations" (discussing Lawrence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 657-63.
• Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind, Oxford UP, 1999.
• "Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief," in Kulp, ed., Realism/Anti-Realism and Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
• "Rationality," in Smith, Osherson, ed., Thinking: Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 3, MIT Press, 1995; revised version appears in Harman, Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind.
• William Harper, University of Alabama
• "Paper Mache Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism," Synthese 116 (1998): 27-49.
• Stephan Hartmann, London School of Economics
• with L. Bovens, "Why There Cannot be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence," forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
• with L. Bovens, "An Impossibility Result for Coherence Rankings," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  
• with L. Bovens, "Coherence and the Role of Specificity: A Response to Meijs and Douven," Mind 114 (2005).
• with L. Bovens, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
• with L. Bovens, "Solving the Riddle of Coherence," Mind 112 (2003): 601-634.
• with L. Bovens, "Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments," Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 29-73.
  
• Sally Haslanger, MIT
• "What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 459-480.
• James Hawthorne, University of Oklahoma
• "Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions," Mind 114 (2005): 277-320.
• with B. Fitelson, “Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence, Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 505–514.
• "Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence," Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (2004): 89-123.
• with L. Bovens, "The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief," Mind 108 (1999): 241-264.
  
• John Hawthorne, Rutgers University --> Oxford University
  
• ed., with T. Gendler, Perceptual Experience (Oxford UP, 2006).
• "The Case for Closure," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 26-43.
• with T. Gendler, "The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for your Epistemic Enemies," Philosophical Studies 124 (2005): 331-352.
• Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford UP, 2004).
• ed., with T.S. Gendler, Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002).
  
• "Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 247-269.
• "Lewis, the Lottery and the Preface," Analysis 62 (2002): 242-51.
• "Implicit Belief and A Priori Knowledge," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 191-210.
• "Reply to [Stewart] Cohen['s 'Contextualism and Skepticism']," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 117-120.
• "The Epistemology of Possible Worlds: A Guided Tour," Philosophical Studies 84 (1996): 183-202.
• with André Gallois, "Externalism and Scepticism," Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 1-26.
• with Daniel Howard-Snyder, "Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant," Religious Studies 32 (1996): 233-258.
• Allan Hazlett, Texas Tech University
• "Grice’s Razor," forthcoming, Metaphilosophy.
• "Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question," forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
• "How to Defeat Belief in the External World," forthcoming, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
  
• Mark Heller, Syracuse University
• "Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000.
• "Relevant Alternatives and Closure," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999): 196-208.
• "The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 115-129.
• "Painted Mules and the Cartesian Circle" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1996, pp. 29-56.
• "The Simple Solution to the Problem of Generality," Noûs 29 (1995): 501-515.
• David Henderson, University of Memphis
• “What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Folk Psychology,” in C. Erneling and D. Johnson, eds., Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
• with T. Horgan, "The A Priori Isn't All that It's Cracked Up to Be, But it Is Something," Philosophical Topics 29 (2002): 219-250.
• with T. Horgan, "Practicing Safe Epistemology," Philosophical Studies 102 (2001): 227-258.
• with T. Horgan, “Iceburg Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61 (2000): 497-535.
• with T. Horgan, “Simulation and Epistemic Competence” in Karsten Steuber, ed., Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences (Westview Press, 2000).
• with T. Horgan, "What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For?," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 51-86.with Terry Horgan, “Iceburg Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.
• “Epistemic Rationality, Epistemic Motivation, and Interpretive Charity,” ProtoSociology 8/9 (1996): 4-29.
• “Ceteris Paribus Generalizations and Causal Knowledge: A Response to Rosenberg,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1996), Spindel Conference Supplement: 205-216.
• “One Naturalized Epistemological Argument Against Coherentist Accounts of Empirical Knowledge,” Erkenntnis 43 (1995): 199-227.
•  Stephen Hetherington, University of New South Wales
• "Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Knowledge's Boundary Problem," Synthese 150 (2006), 41-56.
• "Knowledge that Works: A Tale of Two Conceptual Models," in S. Hetherington, ed., Aspects of Knowing (Elsevier, 2006).
• "How To Know (That Knowledge-That Is Knowledge-How)," in S. Hetherington, ed., Epistemology Futures (Oxford UP, 2006).
• "Knowing (How It Is) That P: Degrees and Qualities of Knowledge," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 129-152.
• "Shattering a Cartesian Sceptical Dream," Principia 8 (2004): 103-17.
• "The Grue Possibility as a Sceptical Possibility?" Philosophia 29 (2002), 253-260.
• "Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2002): 83-102.
• "Epistemic Responsibility -- A Dilemma." The Monist (forthcoming, October 2002)
• Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2001)
• "A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem," Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (2001): 307-324
• "Re: Brains In a Vat," Dialectica 54 (2000): 307-311.
• "Epistemic Disaster Averted," Analysis 59 (1999): 194-200
• "Knowing Failably," Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 565-587.
• "Free Will as a Sceptical Threat to Knowing," Principia 3 (1999): 139-154
• "Actually Knowing," The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 453-469
• "Stove's New Irrationalism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 244-249
• "The Sceptic Is Absolutely Mistaken (As Is Dretske)," Philosophical Papers 27 (1998): 29-43
• "Scepticism on Scepticism," Philosophia 25 (1997): 323-330
• Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology (Westview, 1996).
• "Gettieristic Scepticism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 83-97
• "Foley's Evidence and His Epistemic Reasons," Analysis 56 (1996): 122-126.
• Christopher Hill, Brown University
• "Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge," Analysis 58 (1998): 20-26.
• "Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 567-581.
• Edward S. Hinchman, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
• "Telling as Inviting to Trust," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1995): 562-587.
  
• Thomas Hofweber, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
• "Contextualism and the Meaning-Intention Problem," in K. Korta, E. Sosa, X. Arrazola, ed., Cognition, Agency and Rationality, Philosophical Studies Series, vol. 79 (Kluwer, 1999).
• Jakob Hohwy, Aarhus University, Denmark
• "Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism: A Contextualist Approach," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2002): 235-252.
• Christopher Hookway, University of Sheffield
• "Scepticism and the Principle of Inferential Justification" (pp. 344-365) and "Replies [to Greco, Corbi, and Moya and Grimaltos]" (pp. 395-399), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
• "Epistemic Norms and Theoretical Deliberation," in J. Dancy, ed., Normativity (Blackwell, 2000).
• "Regulating Inquiry: Virtue, Doubt, and Sentiment," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 149-157.
• "Modest Transcendental Arguments and Sceptical Doubts," in R. Stern, ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects (Oxford UP, 1999).
• "Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation', in J. Preston, ed., Thought and Language (Cambridge UP, 1997)
• Terry Horgan, University of Arizona
• with D. Henderson, "The A Priori Isn't All that It's Cracked Up to Be, But it Is Something," Philosophical Topics 29 (2002): 219-250.
• with D. Henderson, "Practicing Safe Epistemology," Philosophical Studies 102 (2001): 227-258.
• with D. Henderson, “Iceburg Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61 (2000): 497-535.
• with D. Henderson, “Simulation and Epistemic Competence” in Karsten Steuber, ed., Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences (Westview Press, 2000).
• with D. Henderson, "What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For?," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 51-86.
• Paul Horwich, CUNY Graduate Center
• "Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 150-169.
• Daniel Howard-Snyder, Western Washington University
• with E.J. Coffman, "Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support," forthcoming, Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
• with C. Lee, "On a 'Fatal Dilemma' for Moderate Foundationalism," Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (2005): 251-259.
• "Foundationalism and Arbitrariness," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 18-24.
• "Lehrer's Case against Foundationalism," Erkenntnis 60 (2004): 51-73.
• with Frances Howard-Snyder and Neil Feit, "Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 304-327.
• "On an 'Unintelligible' Idea: Donald Davidson's Case against Experiential Foundationalism," Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2002): 523-555.
• "BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given," Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1998): 163-177.
• with J. Hawthorne, "Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant," Religious Studies 32 (1996): 233-258.
  
• Michael Huemer, University of Colorado, Boulder
• “Logical Properties of Warrant,” Philosophical Studies 122 (2005): 171-182.
  
• ed., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, 2002.
• "Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification," Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 329-340.
• Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
• "The Problem of Defeasible Justification," Erkenntnis 54 (2001): 375-97.
• "Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 397-413.
• "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 346-57.
• "Probability and Coherence Justification," Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (1997): 463-72.
• David Hunter
• "Understanding, Justification and the A Priori," Philosophical Studies 87 (1997):119-141.
• John Hyman, Oxford University
• "How Knowledge Works," The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 433-451.
• Michael J. Hymers, Dalhousie University
• "Realism and Self-Knowledge: A Problem for Burge," Philosophical Studies86 (1997): 303-325.
• Christopher J. Insole
• "Seeing Off the Local Threat to Irreducible Knowledge by Testimony," Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 44-56.
• Frank Jackson, Australian National University
• "Representation, Scepticism, and the A Priori," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 320-332.
• Stephen Jacobson, Georgia State University
• "Contextualism And Global Doubts About The World," Synthese 129 (2001): 381-404.
• "Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms," Synthese 110 (1997): 381-397.
• "Skepticism, Mitigated Skepticism, and Contextualism," in Keith Lehrer et al. (eds.), Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996): 195-205.
• Carrie Jenkins, University of St. Andrews
• "Knowledge of Arithmetic," forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
• "Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up Call," forthcoming in Philosophia Mathematica.
• "Anti-Realism and Epistemic Accessibility," forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
• "Knowledge and Explanation," forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
  
• Robin Jeshion, University of California, Riverside
• "The Fallibility of Rational Insight," Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 301-310.
• "Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence," Mind 110 (2001): 937-976.
• "Implicit Belief? A Priori Knowledge?," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 211-216.
• "On the Obvious," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 333-355.
• "Proof Checking and Knowledge by Intellection," Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 85-112.
• Bredo C. Johnsen, University of Houston
• "How to Read 'Epistemology Naturalized'," Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005): 78-93.
  
• "Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be," Philosophical Studies 112 (2003): 225-249.
  
• "On the Coherence of Pyrrhonian Skepticism," Philosophical Review 110 (2001): 521-561.
• "Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 385-406.
• Ward E. Jones, Rhodes University, South Africa
• "Can We Infer Naturalism from Scepticism?", Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 433-451.
• "Why Do We Value Knowledge?", American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 423-439.
• Mark Kaplan, Indiana University
• "Chisholm's Grand Move," Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 563-581.
  
• "Who Cares What You Know?" (Critical Study of T. Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits), The Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (2003): 105-116.
  
• "To What Must an Epistemology Be True?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 279-304.
• Decision Theory as Philosophy, Cambridge UP, 1996.
• "Skepticism and Pyrotechnics," Acta Analytica 1996: 157-169.
• "Believing the Improbable," Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 117-146.
• Charlotte Katzoff, Bar Ilan University
• "Counter-Evidence and the Duty to Critically  Reflect," Analysis 60 (2000): 89-96.
• Kevin Kelly, Carnegie Mellon University
• "The Logic of Success," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2000): Supp. 639-666
• "Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia," Erkenntnis 50 (1999): 11-58
• The Logic of Reliable Inquiry, Oxford UP, 1996
• Thomas Kelly, Princeton University
• "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement," forthcoming, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
  
• "Epistemic Rationality As Instrumental Rationality: A Critique," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 612-640.
• "The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes," Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 163-196.
• Andreas Kemmerling, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Ludwigstr
• "How Self-Knowledge Can‘t be Naturalized (Some Remarks on a Proposal by Dretske)," Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 311-328.
• Patricia Kitcher, Columbia University
• "Kant's Epistemological Problem and Its Coherent Solution," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 415-441.
• "Revisiting Kant's Epistemology," Noûs, 1995.
• Philip Kitcher, Columbia University
• "A Priori Knowledge Revisited," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 65-91.
• Peter D. Klein, Rutgers University
• "Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 153-172.
• "Infinitism is the Solution to the Regress Problem," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 131-140.
• "What Is Wrong with Foundationalism Is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 166-171.
  
• "Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 112-125.
• "When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 718-729.
  
• "How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism," in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 75-94.
  
• "Skepticism," in P. Moser, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002): 336-361.
• "Skepticism," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, October, 2001: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism
• "Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 108-116.
• "The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism," Acta Analytica 15 (2000): 7-24.
• "Why Not Infinitism?" Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 199-208.
• "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 297-325.
• “Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 919-925.
• "Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails," Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 213-236.
• "Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility" in J. Kvanvig, ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 97-130.
• with T. Warfield, "No Help for the Coherentist," Analysis 56 (1996): 118-121.
• Keith Korcz, University Louisiana at Lafayette
• "The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
• "Recent Work on the Basing Relation," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 171-191.
• Hilary Kornblith, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
• "Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism," in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (de Gruyter, forthcoming).
• "Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 126-134.
• Knowledge and its Place in Nature, Oxford UP, 2002.
• ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Blackwell, 2001.
• "Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism," in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski, eds., Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (Oxford UP, 2001): 231-248.
• "The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 24-32.
• "The Impurity of Reason," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 67-89.
• "Distrusting Reason" Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 181-196.
• "Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 327-346.
• "In Defence of a Naturalised Epistemology," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 158-169.
• with D. Christensen, "Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the A Priori," Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 1-20.
• "Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics," Philosophical Topics, 23 (1995): 237-255.
• Martin Kusch, University of Cambridge
• Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2002.
• ed., The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge, Kluwer, 2000.
  
• Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Baylor University.  Blog (administrator and the main contributor): Certain Doubts.
  
• The Knowability Paradox, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2006.
  
• "Propositionalism and Narrow Content," forthcoming, Philosophical Issues.
• "Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Lessons in False Hope," forthcoming in J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on Knowability (Oxford UP).
• "Contrastivism and Closure," forthcoming, Social Epistemology.
• "Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat," forthcoming in D. Baker, ed., Philosophy in Focus (Cambridge UP).
• "Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries," forthcoming in D. Pritchard and P. Greenough, ed., Williamson and His Critics (Oxford UP).
• "Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• "Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge," forthcoming T. Crisp, ed., Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing).
• "Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge," Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 201-218.
  
• "On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars' Problem: A Defense of Propositionalism," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 173-190.
• "Truth Is not the Primary Epistemic Goal," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 285-296.
• "Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge," Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 201-218.
  
• "Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification ," American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2003): 3-18.
• The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge UP, 2003.
  
• "Justification and Proper Basing ," in E. Olsson, ed., The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co., 2003).
  
• "Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 27-42.
• "Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?", Monist 81 (1998): 426-451.
• "In Defense of Coherentism," Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 299-306.
• ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).
• "Plantinga's Proper Function Account of Warrant," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 281-303.
• "The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism ," Noûs 29 (1996): 481-500.
• "Coherentists' Distractions," Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 257-75.
• "Coherentism: Misconstrual and Misapprehension," Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1995): 159-68.
• Jennifer Lackey, Northern Illinois University
• "Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1995): 636-658.
• “Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection," Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 163-190.
  
• "A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony," Noûs 37 (2003): 706-723.
• "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission,"  The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 471-490.
• Markus Lammenranta, University of Helsinki
• "Reliabilism and Circularity," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 111-124.
• Charles Landesman, CUNY
• "Moore's Proof of an External World and the Problem of Skepticism," Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (1999): 21-36.
• Harold Langsam, University of Virginia
• "Externalism, Self-knowledge, and Inner Observation," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 42-61.
• Mark Lange, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
  
• "Would 'Direct Realism' Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?", Noûs 38 (2004): 197-232.
• "Okasha on Inductive Scepticism," The Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): 226-232.
• "Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization", Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 294-324.
• "Inductive Confirmation, Counterfactual Conditionals, and Laws of Nature," Philosophical Studies 85 (1997): 1-36.
  
• William S. Larkin, University of Missouri, Columbia
• "Brute Error With Respect to Content," Philosophical Studies 94 (1999): 159-171.
• Andrew Latus, St. Francis Xavier University
• "Our Epistemic Goal," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000): 28-39.
• Pierre Le Morvan, The College of New Jersey
• “A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism,” forthcoming (2005), Metaphilosophy.
• “Goldman on Knowledge as True Belief,” forthcoming (2004), Erkenntnis.
• “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them,” The American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004): 221-234.
• “Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?”, Erkenntnis 56 (2002): 151-168.
  
• Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona
• with A. Habib, "Sosa on Circularity and Coherence," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 106-111.
• "Discursive Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 637-653.
• "Sensitivity, Indiscerbility and Knowledge," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 33-37.
• "Knowledge, Scepticism and Coherence," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 131-139.
• "Rationality," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 206-219.
• "Justification, Coherence and Knowledge," Erkenntnis 50 (1999): 243-258.
• Self Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy (Oxford, 1997).
• "Précis" (pp. 1039-1041) and "Replies" (pp. 1065-1074), Symposium on K. Lehrer Self-Trust, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999).
• "Proper Function versus Systematic Coherence," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 25-45.
• Adam Leite, Indiana University, Bloomington
• “Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1995): 505-533.
  
• “On Justifying and Being Justified,” forthcoming, Philosophical Issues, vol. 14, Epistemology, 2004.
• “On Williamson’s Arguments that Knowledge is a Mental State,” forthcoming, Ratio, 2005.
• "Skepticism, Closure, and Sensitivity, or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to Skepticism," forthcoming, The Croatian Journal of Philosophy, special issue on Robert Nozick.
• “Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?” The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 232–251.
• Isaac Levi, Columbia University
• "Maximizing and Satisficing Evidential Support" in D. Malament, ed., Reading Natural Philosophy: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science and Mathematics (Open Court, 2002).
• The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought, Cambridge UP, 1997.
• "Caution and Nonmonotonic Inference" in M. Sintonen, ed., Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on Jaakko Hintikka's Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997).
• Michael Levin, City College, City University of New York
• "Virtue Epistemology: No New Cures," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 397-410.
• with J. Adler, "Is the Generality Problem too General?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 87-97.
• "Demons, Possibility, and Evidence," Noûs 34 (2000): 422-440.
• "You Can Always Count on Reliabilism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 607-617
  
• "Plantinga on Functions and the Theory of Evolution," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 83-98
  
• David Lewis, died Oct. 14, 2001; had taught at Princeton University
• "Elusive Knowledge," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549-567.  Reprinted in Skepticism (DeRose and Warfield, 1999).
• Louis Loeb, University of Michigan
• Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise (Oxford UP, 2002).
• "Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 279-303.
• "Hume's Explanations of Meaningless Beliefs," Philosophical Quarterly 51(2001): 145-164.
• "Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On Securing Settled Doxastic States," Noûs 32 (1998): 205-230.
• "Causal Inference, Associationism, and Skepticism in Part III of Book I of Hume's 'Treatise'," in P. Easton, ed., Logic and the Workings of the Mind (Ridgeview: Atascadero, 1997).
• "Hume on Stability, Justification, and Unphilosophical Probability," Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995): 101-132.
• "Instability and Uneasiness in Hume's Theories of Belief and Justification," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (1995): 301-327
• Helen Longino, University of Minnesota
• "Toward an Epistemology for Biological Pluralism." in J. Creath and J. Maienschein, ed., Biology and Epistemology (Cambridge UP, 1999).
• "Feminist Epistemology," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 328-353.
• "Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement (1997).
• Peter Ludlow, University of Michigan
• "What was I Thinking? Social Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Shifting Memory Targets," in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (Berlin: de Gruyter, forthcoming).
  
• "Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn In Epistemology" in G. Preyer and G. Peter, eds., Contextualism in Philosophy (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
• ed., with N. Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications, 1998).
• "On the Relevance of Slow Switching" Analysis 57 (1997): 285-286.
• "Social Externalism and Memory: A Problem?," Acta Analytica 1995: 69-76.
• "Social Externalism, Self- Knowledge, and Memory," Analysis 55 (1995): 157-159.
• "Externalism, Self- Knowledge, and the Prevalence of Slow Switching," Analysis 55 (1995): 45-49.
• Steven Luper, Trinity University
• "Epistemic Relativism," forthcoming, Philosophical Issues.
• Essential Knowledge, New York: Addison, Wesley, Longman, Publishers, 2003.
• The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Publishing, 2003.
• "Indiscernability Skepticism," in Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays.
• "Skepticism and the Sociology of Knowledge," Facta Philosophica 3 (2001) 197-210.
• William Lycan, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
• “Dretske’s Ways of Introspecting,” forthcoming in B. Gertler, ed., Privileged Access and First Person Authority (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing).
• “Moore Against the New Skeptics,” Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 35-53.
• "Dretske on the Mind‘s Awareness of Itself," Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 125-133.
• "Bealer on the the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge," Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 143-50; reprinted in A. Casullo, ed., A Priori Knowledge (1999).
• "Plantinga and Coherentisms," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 3-23.
•  Michael P. Lynch, Connecticut College
• "Beyond the Walls of Reason," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 529-536.
• "Hume and the Limits of Reason," Hume Studies 22 (1996): 89-104.
• Jack C. Lyons, University of Arkansas
• "Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks," Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 237-56.
• "General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume’s Treatise," Hume Studies 27 (2001): 247-277.
• "Testimony, Induction, and Folk Psychology," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 163-178.
  
• John MacFarlane, University of California, Berkeley
• "The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions," Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005): 197-233.
• "Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism," Analysis 65 (2005): 132-138.
• Penelope Maddy, University of California, Irvine
• "Naturalism and the A Priori," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 92-116.
• P.D. Magnus, University of California, San Diego
• with J. Cohen, "Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation," Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 37-52
• Pat A. Manfredi, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
• "The Compatibility of A Priori Knowledge and Empirical Defeasibility: A Defense of a Modest A Priori," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 159-177.
• Peter J. Markie, University of Missouri, Columbia
• “Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief,” Noûs 40 (2006): 118-142.
• “The Mystery of Perceptual Justification,” Philosophical Studies. 126 (2005): 347-373.
  
• “Easy Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 406-416.
• "Nondosxastic Perceptual Evidence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 530-553.
  
• "Modest A Priori Knowledge and Justification," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 179-189.
• "In Defense of One Form of Traditional Epistemology," Philosophical Studies 85 (1997): 37-55.
• "Degrees of Warrant," in J. Kvanvig, ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 221-238.
• "Goldman's New Reliabilism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 799-817.
• Michael Martin, University College London
• "The Transparency of Experience," Mind and Language, 17 (2002).
• "Episodic Memory as Retained Acquaintance," in Hoerl, McCormack, ed., Time and Memory (Oxford UP, 2001).
  
• Noah Martin
• ed., with P. Ludlow, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications, 1998).
• John McDowell, University of Pittsburgh
• "Knowledge and the Internal Revisited," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 97-105.
• "Prècis" (pp. 365-368) and "Reply to Commentators" (pp. 403-431), Symposium on J. McDowell, Mind and World [Harvard UP, 1994], Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998).
• "Knowledge and the Internal," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 877-893.
• Matthew McGrath, University of Missouri, Columbia
• with Jeremy Fantl, "Knowledge and the Purely Epistemic: A Defense of Pragmatic Encroachment," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  
• with Jeremy Fantl, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 67-94.
• Lydia M. McGrew, Kalamazoo, Michigan
• with Timothy McGrew, "What's Wrong with Epistemic Circularity?," Dialogue 39 (2000): 219-239.
• with Timothy McGrew, "Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation," Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (2000): 47-66.
• with Timothy McGrew, "Psychology for Armchair Philosophers," Idealistic Studies 28 (1998): 147-157.
• with Timothy McGrew, "Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem," Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998): 239-256.
• with Timothy McGrew, "Level Connections in Epistemology," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 85-94.
• Timothy McGrew, Western Michigan University
• "Has Plantinga Refuted the Historical Argument?," Philosophia Christi 6 (2004): 7-26.
• "Confirmation, Heuristics, and Explanatory Reasoning," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003): 553-567.
• "Direct Inference and the Problem of Induction," Monist 84 (2001): 153-178.
• with Lydia McGrew, "What's Wrong with Epistemic Circularity?," Dialogue 39 (2000): 219-239.
  
• with Lydia McGrew, "Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation," Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (2000): 47-66.
• "How Foundationalists Do Crossword Puzzles," Philosophical Studies 96 (1999): 329-346.
• “A Defense of Classical Foundationalism,” in L. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed. (Wadsworth, 1998).
• with Lydia McGrew, "Psychology for Armchair Philosophers," Idealistic Studies 28 (1998): 147-157.
• with Lydia McGrew, "Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem," Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998): 239-256.
• with Lydia McGrew, "Level Connections in Epistemology," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 85-94.
• The Foundations of Knowledge (Littlefield Adams, 1995).
• Brian McLaughlin, Rutgers University
• with M. Tye, "The Brown-McKinsey Charge of Inconsistency," in Ludlow and Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (1998).
• with M. Tye, "Externalism, Twin-Earth, and Self-Knowledge," in McDonald, Smith and Wright, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge (Oxford UP, 1998).
• with M. Tye, "Is Content Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?" Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 349-380.
• Kevin Meeker, University of South Alabama
• “Was Hume a Proper Functionalist?”, forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  
• “Justification and the Social Nature of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 156-172.
• “Truth, Justification, and the Epistemic Way,” Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (2003): 287-309.
• “Is Hume’s Epistemology Internalist or Externalist?”, Dialogue 40 (2001): 125-146.
• “Hume’s Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000): 221-238.
• “Knowledge from Gossip?”, Philosophia 27 (1999): 537-539.
• “Chisholming Away at Plantinga’s Critique of Epistemic Deontology,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 90-96.
• “Hume: Radical Sceptic or Naturalized Epistemologist?”, Hume Studies 24 (1998): 31-52.
• “Should We Abandon Epistemic Justification?”, Southwest Philosophy Review13 (1997): 129-136.
• Alan Millar, University of Stirling
  
• "Travis's Sense of Occasion," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 337-342.
• "The Scope of Perceptual Knowledge," Philosophy 75 (2000): 73-88.
  
• Richard Miller, Cornell University
• "Externalist Self-Knowledge and the Scope of the A Priori," Analysis 57 (1997): 67-75.
• "The Norms of Reason," The Philosophical Review 104 (1995).
• Nenad Miscevic, University of Maribor
• "Intuition as a Second Window,"  The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 87-112.
• Richard Moran, Harvard University
• Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton UP, 2001.
• "Prècis" (pp. 423-426) and "Replies to Heal, Reginster, Wilson, and Lear" (pp. 455-472), Symposium on R. Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004).
• "Interpretation Theory and the First Person," The Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 154-173.
  
• Adam Morton, University of Alberta
• "Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity," Noûs 38 (2004): 481-502.
• with A. Karjalainen, "Contrastive Knowledge, " Philosophical Explorations 6 (2003): 74-89
• "If You’re So Smart Why Are You Ignorant: Causal Epistemic Paradoxes,"Analysis 62 (2002): 110-115.
  
• Paul K. Moser, Loyola University of Chicago
• "Skepticism Undone?" in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 135-144.
• "Skepticism, Question Begging, and Burden Shifting," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 209-217.
• "Realism, Objectivity and Scepticism," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 70-91.
• with D.H. Mulder and J.D. Trout, The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction, Oxford UP, 1998.
• "Epistemological Fission: On Unity and Diversity in Epistemology," The Monist 81 (1998): 353-70.
• with D. Yandell, "Against Naturalizing Rationality," Protosociology 8 (1996): 81-96.
• Carlos J. Moya, Universitat de Valencia
• (with Tobies Grimaltos) "Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 386-394.
• Peter Murphy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville --> University of Indianapolis.
• with Tim Black, "In Defense of Sensitivity," forthcoming, Synthese.
• "A Strategy for Asssessing Closure," forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
• "Reliability Connections Between Conceivability and Inconceivability," Dialectica 60 (2006): 195-205.
• "Closure Failures for Safety," Philosophia 33 (2005): 331-334.
• "A Sceptical Rejoinder to Sensitivity-Contextualism," Dialogue 44 (2005): 693-706.
• with Tim Black, "Avoiding the Dogmatic Commitments of Contextualism," Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 165-182.
  
• N.M.L. Nathan, University of Liverpool (retired)
• "Stoics and Sceptics: A Reply to Brueckner," Analysis 64 (2004): 264-268.
• The Price of Doubt, London: Routledge, 2001.
• "Naturalism and Self-Defeat: Plantinga's Version," Religious Studies 33 (1997), 135-42.
• Dana Nelkin, University of California, San Diego
• "Self-Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe," forthcoming, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
• "The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality," Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 373-409.
• Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
• “Contextualism and a Puzzle about Seeing,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• “A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” forthcoming, Grazer Philosophische Studien.
• “Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology,” forthcoming, Synthese.
• with G. Rohrbaugh, “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2004): 396-406.
• “Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 296-325.
• "Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 199-214.
• "Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 396-411.
• "Contextualism and the Problem of the External World," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 1-31.
• "S Knows that P," Noûs 36 (2002): 663-681
• “Stroud and Moore on Skepticism,” Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1997): 83-89.
• Shaun Nichols, University of Utah
• with S. Stich, J. Weinberg, "Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology," in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 227-247.
• with J. Weinberg, S. Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-460.
  
• Ilkka Niiniluoto, University of Helsinki
• "Is It Rational to Be Rational?" Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 115-122.
• Robert Nozick, died Jan. 23, 2002; had taught at Harvard University
• Susana Nuccetelli, Washington and Lee University
• "What Anti-Individualists Cannot Know A Priori," Analysis 59 (1999): 48-51.
• Tim Oakley, La Trobe University
• "A Skeptic's Reply to Lewisian Contextualism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2001): 309-332.
• "The Invalidation of Induction: A Reply to Pargetter and Bigelow," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 452-463.
• Samir Okasha, University of Bristol
• "Scepticism and its Sources," Philosophy and Phenomonelogical Research 67 (2003): 610-632.
• Doris Olin, York University
• "A Case Against Closure," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 235-248.
• Erik J. Olsson, Lund University
• "Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 98-126.
• "Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency," Synthese 135 (2003): 119-140.
• with L. Bovens, "Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions," Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 137-150.
• "What Is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?", Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 246-272.
• "Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 273-288.
• "Corroborating Testimony and Ignorance: A Reply to Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 565-572.
• "Why Coherence Is Not Truth-Conducive," Analysis 61 (2001): 236-241.
• with L. Bovens, "Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks," Mind 109 (2000): 685-719.
• with S. Hansson, "Providing Foundations for Coherentism," Erkenntnis 51 (1999): 243-265.
• "Cohering With," Erkenntnis 50 (1999): 273-291.
• "Doxastic Decision Theory, Voluntarism and the Primacy of Practical Reason" in A. Meigers, ed., Belief, Cognition and the Will (Tilburg University Press, 1999).
  
• "Competing for Acceptance: Lehrer's Rule and the Paradoxes of Justification," Theoria 64 (1998): 34-54.
• "Making Beliefs Coherent," Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (1998): 143-163.
• "A Coherence Interpretation of Semi-Revision," Theoria 63 (1997): 105-134.
• "Coherence and the Modularity of Mind," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 404-411.
  
• David Owens, University of Sheffield
• "Epistemic Akrasia," The Monist 85 (2002): 381-397.
• Reason without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity (Routledge, 2000).
• "Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (2000) Supp: 119-142.
• "The Authority of Memory," European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1999): 312-329.
• George Pappas, Ohio State University
• "Berkeley and Scepticism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 133-149.
• "Experts, Knowledge, and Perception," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 239-250.
• "Epistemology in the Empiricists," History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1998): 285-302.
• Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado, Boulder
• "Who Needs an Answer to Skepticism?" American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 421-32.
• "William Heytesbury on Knowledge: Epistemology Without Necessary and Sufficient Conditions," History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (1995): 347-66.
• Christopher Peacocke, Columbia University
• The Realm of Reason, Oxford UP, 2004.
• “Explaining Perceptual Entitlement,” in Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge, (Berlin: de Gruyter, expected 2004).
• “Three Principles of Rationalism,” European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002): 375-397.
  
• edited, with P. Boghossian, New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford UP, 2000.
• "Explaining the A Priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 255-285.
• Being Known, Oxford UP, 1999.
• “Conscious Attitudes, Attention and Self-Knowledge”, in McDonald, Smith, Wright, ed., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge, Oxford UP, 1998.
• "Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality," Philosophical Issues 9 (1998).
• “First-Person Reference , Representational Independence, and Self-Knowledge”, in Kunne, Newen, Anduschus, ed., Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, CSLI Publications, Stanford , 1997.
• "Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 117-158.
• Michael Pendlebury, University of the Witwatersrand
• "Perception and Objective Knowledge," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 29-38.
• Alvin Plantinga, Notre Dame
• Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford UP, 1999.
• "Warrant and Accidentally True Belief," Analysis 57 (1997): 140-145.
• "Respondeo" (responses to a slew of critics), in J. Kvanvig, ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 307-378.
• "What's the Question?", Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 19-43.
• John L. Pollock, University of Arizona
• with Joseph Cruz, "The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism," in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (New York: de Gruyter, forthcoming).
• Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd edition (coauthored with Joseph Cruz), Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
• "Procedural Epistemology - At the Interface of Philosophy and AI," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 383-414.
• Ted Poston, University of South Alabama
• "Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• Josep L. Prades, Universitatde Girona
• "Scepticism, Contextualism, and Closure," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 121-131.
• Duncan Pritchard, University of Stirling
• What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?, forthcoming, Routledge.
• ed., with P. Greenough, Williamson on Knowledge, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  
• ed., with V. Hendricks, New Waves in Epistemology, forthcoming, Ashgate.
  
• "Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries," in Pritchard and Hendricks, ed., New Waves in Epistemology, forthcoming, Ashgate.
  
• "Wittgenstein on Scepticism," in M. McGinn, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  
• "Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology," in J. Greco, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  
• "How to be a Neo-Moorean," in S. Goldberg, ed., Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
  
• "Anti-Luck Epistemology," forthcoming, Synthese.
  
• "Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• "Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism," forthcoming, Social Epistemology.
• "Moral and Epistemic Luck," forthcoming, Metaphilosophy.
  
• Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005.
• with M. Blaauw, Epistemology A-Z, Edinburgh UP/Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
• "Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 185-205.
• "Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism," in D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, ed., Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein's Last Work, Oxford UP, 2005.
• "Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge," Philosophical Explorations (2005): 229-243.
• "Neo-Mooreanism versus Contextualism," Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (2005): 20-43.
• with C. van Putten, "Greco on Scepticism," forthcoming, Erkenntnis (2005).
• with M. Brady, "Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 161-171.
• "The Structure of Sceptical Arguments," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 37-52.
• "The Epistemology of Testimony," Philosophical Issues 11 (2004): 326-48.
• "Epistemic Deflationism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004): 1-32.
• "Epistemic Luck," Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 193-22.
• with J. Kallestrup, "An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism," Philosophia 31 (2004).
• "Some Recent Work in Epistemology," The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 605-13.
• ed., with M.S. Brady, Moral and Epistemic Virtues, Basil Blackwell, 2003.
• "McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism," European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 273-94.
• "Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck," Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 106-30.
• "Reforming Reformed Epistemology," International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003): 43-66; reprinted in R. Rood and R. van Woudenberg, ed., The Epistemology of Basic Belief, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004.
• "Recent Work on Radical Skepticism," American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002): 215-57.
• "McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments," Synthese 130 (2002): 279-302.
• "Resurrecting the Moorean Response to Scepticism," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2002): 283-307.
• "Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and Closure," Theoria 69 (2002): 129-61.
• "Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism," Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (2002): 19-55.
• "Meta-Epistemological Constraints on Anti-Sceptical Theories," Facta Philosophica 3 (2001): 101-26.
• "The Opacity of Knowledge," in H.B. Shaeffer, ed., Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 2: The Internalism/Externalism Debate in Epistemology (Humboldt UP, 2001): 1-10.
• "A Puzzle About Warrant," Philosophical Inquiry 23 (2001).
• "Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and the ‘Metaepistemological’ Challenge," Principia - Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 5 (December, 2001).
• "Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and Hinge Propositions," Wittgenstein-Studien (December, 2001).
• "Scepticism and Dreaming," Philosophia 28 (March, 2000).
• "Closure and Context," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000): 275-80.
• "Wittgenstein, 'Hinge' Propositions, and On Certainty," in B. Brogaard, B. Smith, ed., Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg, Austria: Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society, 2000): 84-90.
• "Is 'God Exists' a 'Hinge' Proposition of Religious Belief?," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000): 129-40.
• "Understanding Scepticism," Sats - The Nordic Journal of Philosophy2 (2000): 107-23.
• "Charity and Context: Davidson and Wittgenstein on the Priority of Semantics over Epistemology," Philosophical Writings 7 (1998): 43-61.
• James Pryor, New York University
  
• "Externalism about Content and McKinsey-style Reasoning," forthcoming in Ezcurdia, Stainton, Viger, ed., New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind.
• "There Is Immediate Justification," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 181-202.
• "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?," Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 349-378.
  
• "Highlights of Recent Epistemology," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2001): 95-124.
• "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist," Noûs 34 (2000): 517-549.
• "Immunity to Error through Misidentification," Philosophical Topics26 (1999).
• Joel Pust, University of Deleware
• "Kitcher on Tradition-Independent A Priori Warrant," The Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): 373-376.
• "Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions," Philosophical Studies.106 (2001): 227-258.
• "Warrant and Analysis," Analysis 60 (2000): 51-57.
• with Alvin Goldman, "Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence," in W. Ramsey and M. DePaul, ed., Rethinking Intuition, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
• Hilary Putnam, Harvard University (emeritus)
• Peter Railton, University of Michigan
• "A Priori Rules: Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 170-196.
• Baron Reed, Northern Illinois University
• "Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless," Synthese 148 (2006): 303-8.
• "Accidentally Factive Mental States," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 134-42.
  
• “How to Think about Fallibilism,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 143-157.
• “Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2001): 507-526.
• "Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification," Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 57-67
• Steven Reynolds, Arizona State University
• "Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals," Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 139-161.
• "The Argument from Illusion," Noûs 34 (2000): 604-621
• "Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998) 529-558.
• Mark Richard, Tufts University
• "Contextualism and Relativism," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 215-242.
• Steven Rieber, Georgia State University
• "Skepticism and Contrastive Explanation," Noûs 32 (1998): 189 -204.
• Wayne Riggs, University of Oklahoma
• "Balancing our Epistemic Goals," forthcoming, Noûs.
• "Reliability and the Value of Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 79-96
• "Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing That p," Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 87-108
• "What Are the 'Chances' of Being Justified?" The Monist 81 (1998): 452-472.
• "The Weakness of Strong Justification," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997): 179-189.
• "Truth, Justification, and Epistemic Value," and "Author’s Replies" [to commentaries by Michael Huemer and Ben Fischer], The Journal of the Association for Systematic Philosophy 2 (1996): 1-9, 12-15.
• Tom Rockmore, Dusquesne University
• "Knowledge as Historical," forthcoming, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 123-132.
• On Hegel's Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy (Humanities Press, 1996).
• Alex Rosenberg, Duke University
• "Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative Materialists," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 335-358.
• Jay F. Rosenberg, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
• Thinking About Knowing, Oxford UP, 2002
• Three Conversations About Knowing, Hackett Publishing, 2000
• "Scrutinizing a Trade," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 58-66.
• "Descartes’ Skeptical Argument", Logical analysis and History of philosophy 1 (1998): pp. 209-32.
• Sherrilyn Roush, University of California, Berkeley
  
• Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
• Patrick Rysiew, University of British Columbia
• "Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach," forthcoming, Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
• "Reidian Evidence," Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2005): 107-121.
• "Contesting Contextualism," Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 51-70.
  
• "Reid and Epistemic Naturalism", Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): 437-456.
• "The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions," Noûs 35 (2001): 477-514.
• "Testimony, Simulation, and the Limits of Inductivism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000): 269-274.
• Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin
• "Warrant-Transmission, Defeaters and Disquotation," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 191-200.
• "Easy Possibilities," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 907-919.
• Joe Salerno, St. Louis University
• ed., New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
• "Knowability Noir: 1945-1963," forthcoming in J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on the Knowability Paradox (Oxford UP).
• with B. Brogaard, “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle,” forthcoming, American Philosophical Quarterly.
• "Truth-tracking and the Problem of Reflective Knowledge," forthcoming in J. Keim-Campbell and M. O'Rourke, eds., Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 5: Knowledge and Skepticism (MIT Press).
• with B. Brogaard, “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” forthcoming in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., New Waves in Epistemology, Ashgate.
• with B. Brogaard, "Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant," Analysis 62 (2002): 143-150.
  
• Sarah Sawyer, University of Nebraska
• "Conceptual Errors and Social Externalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 265-273.
• "My Language Disquotes," Analysis (1999): 206-11.
  
• "An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 358-78.
  
• "Privileged Access to the World," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 523-33.
  
• Jonathan Schaffer, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
• "Contrastive Knowledge," forthcoming, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
• "From Contextualism to Contrastivism," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 73-103.
• "Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 138-155.
  
• "Perceptual Knowledge Derailed," Philosophical Studies 112 (2003): 31-45.
• "Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues," Analysis 61 (2001): 202-208.
• Stephen Schiffer, New York Universityh
• "Paradox and the A Priori," forthcoming, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
• "Skepticism and the Vagaries of Justified Belief," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 161-184.
• "Amazing Knowledge" (discussion of Stanley and Williamson's "Knowing How"), Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 200-202.
• "The Epistemic Theory of Vagueness," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 481-503.
• "Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 317-333.
• Frederick Schmitt, Indiana University
• "Social Epistemology," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 354-382.
• "Socializing Epistemology," pp. 1-27 and "The Justification of Group Beliefs," p. 257-287, both in F. Schmitt, ed., Socializing Epistemology (Rowman and Littlefield, 1995).
• Eric Schwitzgebel, University of California, Riverside.  Blog: The Splintered Mind.
  
• "No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience -- Contra Dennett?," forthcoming, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
• "Do Things Look Flat?," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Difference Tone Training: A Demonstration Adapted from Titchener's Experimental Psychology," Psyche 11 (2005).
• "Introspective Training: Reflections on Titchener's Lab Manual," Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004), no. 7-8: 58-76.
• "How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery," Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (2002), no. 5-6: 35-53.
• "A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief," Noûs 36 (2002): 249-275.
• "In-Between Believing," Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 76-82.
• with Michael S. Gordon, "How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation," Philosophical Topics 28 (2000): 235-246.
  
• Thomas D. Senor, University of Arkansas
• "The Prima/Ultima Facie Justification Distinction in Epistemology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 551-566.
• "Harman, Negative Coherentism, and the Problem of Ongoing Justification," Philosophia 24 (1995): 271-294.
• Stewart Shapiro, Ohio State University
• "The Status of Logic," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 333-366.
• Tomoji Shogenji, Rhode Island College
• "A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs," Noûs 40 (2006): 331-346.
• "Justification by Coherence from Scratch," Philosophical Studies 125 (2005): 305-325
• "The Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001): 90-106.
• "Is Coherence Truth Conducive?", Analysis 60 (1999): 338-345.
  
• Nishi Shah, Amherst College
• "A New Argument for Evidentialism," forthcoming, The Philosophical Quarterly.
• with Jeffrey Kasser, "The Ethics of Belief and the Metaethics of Belief," Social Epistemology 20 (2006): 1–17.
• with David Velleman, "Doxastic Deliberation," Philosophical Review, 114 (2005): 497-534.
• "How Truth Governs Belief," Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 447-82.
• "Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism," The Monist (2002): 436-45.
  
• Harvey Siegel, University of Miami
• "Naturalism and Normativity: Hooker's Ragged Reconciliation," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29 (1998): 639-652.
• “Instrumental Rationality and Naturalized Philosophy of Science,” Philosophy of Science 63, Supplement (PSA 1996 Proceedings): S116-S124.
• “Naturalism, Instrumental Rationality, and the Normativity of Epistemology,” Protosoziologie 8/9 (1996): 97-110.
• "On Some Recent Challenges to the Ideal Reason," Inquiry 15 (1996): 2-16.
• “Naturalized Epistemology and ‘First Philosophy’,” Metaphilosophy 26 (1995): 46-62.
• “‘Radical’ Pedagogy Requires ‘Conservative’ Epistemology,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 29 (1995): 33-46.
• “Knowledge and Certainty: Feminism, Postmodernism, and Multiculturalism,” in W. Kohli, ed., Critical Conversations in Philosophy of Education (New York: Routledge, 1995): 190-200.
• “Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies” (co-authored with John Biro), in F. van Eemeren, et. al., eds., Analysis and Evaluation: Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Volume II (Amsterdam SICSAT, 1995): 286-299; reprinted with minor changes in Argumentation 11 (1997): 277-292.
• Nicholas Silins, New York University
• "Transmission Failure Failure," Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 71-102.
• Miriam Solomon, Temple University
• Social Empiricism (MIT Press, 2001).
• Ernest Sosa, Brown University and RutgersUniversity
• "Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 35-65.
• with Laurence BonJour, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
• "The Place of Truth in Epistemology," in M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski, ed., Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002).
• "Plantinga's Evolutionary Meditations," in J. Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated (Cornell UP, 2002): 91-103.
• "Reliability and the A Priori," in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, ed., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002): 369-385.
• "Human Knowledge, Animal and Reflective," Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 193-196.
• ed. (with J. Kim), Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2000).
• "Skepticism and Contextualism" (pp. 1-18) and "Replies [to Tomberlin, Kornblith, and Lehrer]" (pp. 38-41), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
• "Modal and Other A Priori Epistemology: How Can We Know What is Possible and What Impossible?" The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 1-16.
• "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 141-153.
• "Skepticism and the Internal/External Divide," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 145-157.
• "P.F. Strawson's Epistemological Naturalism" in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson (Open-Court, 1998).
• "How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A Lesson from Descartes," Philosophical Studies 85 (1997): 229-49.
• "Mythology of the Given," History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (1997): 275-286.
• "Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 410-30.
• "Chisholm's Epistemology and Epistemic Internalism" in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, 1997.
• "Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status," Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 151-162.
• "Plantinga on Epistemic Internalism" (pp. 73-83) and Postscript to "Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology" (pp. 271-280), in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).
• "Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology: A Response to Dancy and BonJour," Philosophical Studies 78 (1995): 221-234.
• Jason Stanley, Rutgers University
• Knowledge and Practical Interests, Oxford UP, 2005.
  
• "Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions," Analysis 65 (2005): 126-131.
  
• "On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 119-146.
• with T. Williamson, "Knowing How," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-44.
• "Understanding, Context-Relativity, and the Description Theory," Analysis 59 (1999): 14-18.
• Vyachevslav Stepin, Moscow Institute of Philosophy
• "Knowledge as Cultural and Historical System," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 133-138.
• Edward Stein, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University
• "Can We Be Justified in Believing that Humans Are Irrational?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 545-565.
• Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Oxford UP, 1996.
• Christopher L. Stephens, University of Oklahoma
• "When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument," Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 161-189.
• Robert Stern, University of Sheffield
• "Coherence as a Test for Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 296-326.
• Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism: Answering the Question of Justification, Oxford UP, 2000.
  
• ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Oxford UP, 1999.
• "Hegel, Scepticism and Transcendental Arguments," in R-P.Horstmann and H.Fulda, eds., Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels (Klett-Cotta, 1996).
  
• Matthias Steup, St. Cloud State University
• ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (Oxford UP, 2001).
• "Epistemic Duty, Evidence, and Internality: A Reply to Alvin Goldman," in Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (Oxford UP, 2001).
• "Epistemic Duty and Doxastic (In)Voluntarism," Acta Analytica 15 (2000): 25-56.
• "A Defense of Internalism", in L. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1998).
• "Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantinga's Proper Functioning Theory," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995).
• Stephen Stich , Rutgers University
• with S. Nichols, J.M. Weinberg, "Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology," in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 227-247.
• with R. Samuels, M. Bishop, "Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Disputes about Human Rationality Disappear," in R. Elio, ed., Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 236-268.
• with J. Weinberg, S. Nichols, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-460.
  
• Kevin L. Stoehr, Boston University
• "The Virtues of Circular Reasoning," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 159-171.
• Jim Stone, University of New Orleans
• "Contextualism and Warranted Assertion," forthcoming, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
• "Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 527-545.
• Barry Stroud, University of California, Berkeley
• "Perceptual Knowledge and Epistemological Satisfaction," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 165-173.
• "Unpurged Pyrrhonism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 411-416.
• "Epistemological Reflection on Knowledge of the External World," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 345-358.
• "The Charm of Naturalism," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 70 (1996): 43-55.
• "Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection" in R. Popkin, ed., Scepticism in the History of Philosophy: A Pan-American Dialogue (Kluwer, 1996).
• Jonathan Sutton, Southern Methodist University
• "Stick to What You Know," Noûs 39 (2005): 359-396.
• "The Contingent A Priori and Implicit Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 251-277.
• Marshall Swain, Ohio State University
• "Warrant versus Indefeasible Justification," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 131-146.
• Richard Swinburne, Oxford University (retired)
• Epistemic Justification (Oxford UP, 2001)
• "Many Kinds of Rational Theistic Belief," in Bruntrup, Tacelli, ed., The Rationality of Theism (Kluwer, 1999)
• William Talbott, University of Washington, Seattle
• "The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 199-206.
• "Intentional Self-Deception in a Single, Coherent Self," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 27-74.
• William Throop, Green Mountain College
• "Defeating the Skeptic," Philosophia 26 (1998): 321-336.
• James E. Tomberlin, died Oct. 13, 2002; had taught at California State University, Northridge
• "Skepticism, Tracking, and Warrant," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 19-23.
• Charles Travis, Northwestern University --> King's College, London
  
• "A Sense of Occasion," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 286-314.
• J.D. Trout, Loyola University (Chicago)
• with M. Bishop, “The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology,” forthcoming, Nous.
• with M. Bishop, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Oxford UP, 2005.
• with M. Bishop, "Epistemology’s Search for Significance," Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15 (2003): 203-216.
• with P. Moser and D. Mulder, The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction, Oxford UP, 1998.
  
• Michael Tye, University of Texas, Austin
• “Externalism and Memory I," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 72 (1998): 77-94.
• with B. McLaughlin, "The Brown-McKinsey Charge of Inconsistency," in Ludlow and Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (1998).
• with B. McLaughlin, "Externalism, Twin-Earth, and Self-Knowledge," in McDonald, Smith and Wright, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge(Oxford UP, 1998).
• with B. McLaughlin, "Is Content Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?" Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 349-380.
• Peter Unger, New York University
• Hamid Vahid, Institute for studies in theoretical Physics and Mathematics, Tehran
• Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge, Palgrave, Macmillan, forthcoming.
• "Aiming at Truth: Doxastic Vs. Epistemic Goals,", forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• "Varieties of Epistemic Conservatism," Synthese 141 (2004): 97-122.
• "Doubts about Epistemic Supervenience," Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 153-172.
  
• "Externalism, Slow Switching and Privileged Self-Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 370-388
• "Content Externalism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate in Justification Theory," European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 89-107
• "The Nature and Significance of Transcendental Arguments," Kant Studien 93 (2002): 273-290
• "Skepticism and Varieties of Epistemic Universalizability," Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (2001): 325-341
• "Realism and the Epistemological Significance of Inference to the Best Explanation," Dialogue 40 (2001): 487-507
• "Charity, Supervenience, and Skepticism," Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 308-325
• "Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck," Dialectica 55 (2001): 351-362
• "A Priori Knowledge, Experience and Defeasibility," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1999): 173-188.
• "Deontic vs. Nondeontic Conceptions of Epistemic Justification," Erkenntnis 49 (1998): 285-301.
• "The Internalism/Externalism Controversy: The Epistemization of an Older Debate," Dialectica 52 (1998): 229-246.
• "Deductive Closure, Scepticism and the Paradoxes of Confirmation," Ratio 8 (1995): 70-86.
• Luis M. Vales-Villanueva, Universidad de Oviedo
• "Contextualism and Levels of Scrutiny," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 72-79.
• James Van Cleve, University of Southern California
  
• "Why Coherence Is not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 168-180.
• "Is Knowledge Easy--or Impossible? Externalism As the Only Alternative to Skepticism," in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 45-59.
• "Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 218-237.
  
• "Epistemic Supervenience Revisited," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1999).
• Bas van Fraassen, Princeton University
• "The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 253-280.
• "The agnostic subtly probabilified," Analysis 58 (1998): 212-220.
• "Sola Experientia?--Feyerabend's Refutation of Classical Empiricism," Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): S385-S395.
• "Probabilite conditionelle et certitude," Dialogue 36 (1997): 69-90.
• "Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the Sirens," Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 7-37.
• "Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of belief," Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (1995): 349-377.
• "Against Naturalized Epistemology," in Leonardi, Paolo, ed., On Quine: New Essays (Cambridge UP, 1995).
• Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame
• "Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis?," in A. Chignell and A. Dole, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 131-149.
• "Modal Epistemology," Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 67-84.
• J. David Velleman, New York University
• with Nishi Shah, "Doxastic Deliberation," Philosophical Review, 114 (2005): 497-534.
• John M. Vickers, Claremont Graduate University
• "I Believe It, But Soon I‘ll Not Believe It Any More: Scepticism, Empiricism, And Reflection,"  Synthese 124 (2000): 155-174.
• Enrique Villanueva, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
• "What Has Contextualism to Do with Skepticism?," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 67-71.
• Jonathan Vogel, Amherst College --> University of California, Davis (starting Fall of '06)
  
• "The Refutation of Skepticism," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 72-84.
• "Skeptical Arguments," Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 426-455.
  
• "The New Relevant Alternatives Theory," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 155-180.
• "Skepticism and Foundationalism: A Reply to Michael Williams," Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 11-28.
• Ted A. Warfield, University of Notre Dame 
  
• "Tyler Burge's Self-knowledge," forthcoming, Grazer Philosophische Studien.
  
• "When Epistemic Closure Does and Does Not Fail: A Lesson from the History of Epistemology," Analysis 64 (2004): 35-41.
  
• ed., with K. DeRose, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford UP, 1999).
• "A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds," Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 127-147. Reprinted in Skepticism (ed., DeRose and Warfield, 1999).
• "Externalism, Privileged Access, and the Irrelevance of Slow Switching," Analysis 57 (1997): 282-84.  Reprinted in Ludlow and Martin, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (1998).
• with P. Klein, "No Help for the Coherentist," Analysis 56 (1996): 118-121.
• "Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 525-545.
• Brian Weatherson, Cornell University -- blog: Thoughts Arguments and Rants.
  
• "Scepticism, Rationalism, and Externalism," Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005): 311-331.
• with Andy Egan and John Hawthorne, “Epistemic Modals in Context,” forthcoming in Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, eds., Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth (Oxford UP 2005), pp. 131-169.
• “Can we Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 417-43.
  
• Mark Webb, Texas Tech University
• "Can Epistemology Help? The Problem of the Kentucky-fried Rat," Social Epistemology 18 (2004): 51-58.
• "Feminist Epistemology as Whipping-Girl," in A. Cudd, A. Superson, ed., Theorizing Backlash: Philosophical Reflections on the Backlash Against Feminism (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 49-65.
• "Social Epistemology and Political Critique," Southwest Philosophical Studies, 1998, 92-98.
• "A Suggestion for Doxastic Practice Epistemology," Southwest Philosophical Studies 1996, 150-160.
  
• "Fallibilism Is Not a Thesis," Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1996): 45-51.
• "Feminist Epistemology and the Extent of the Social," Hypatia 10 (1995): 85-98.
• Ralph Wedgwood, Oxford University
• "The Aim of Belief", Philosophical Perspectives 16 (2002): 267-297.
• "Internalism Explained," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 349-369.
• "The A Priori Rules of Rationality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 113-131.
• Jonathan Weinberg, Indiana University, Bloomington
• with S. Nichols, S. Stich, "Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology," in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 227-247.
• with S. Nichols, S. Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-460.
• Matthew Weiner, Texas Tech University
  
• “Must We Know What We Say?”, forthcoming, Philosophical Review.
• “Why Does Justification Matter?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 422-444.
  
• "Accepting Testimony," Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 256-264.
• Bernhard Weiss, University of Wales
• "Generalizing Brains in Vats," Analysis 60 (2000): 112-123.
• Leora Weitzman
• "What Makes a Causal Theory of Content Anti-Skeptical?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 299-318.
• Merold Westphal, Fordham University
• "Hermeneutics as Epistemology," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 415-435.
• Roger White, New York University
• "Problems for Dogmatism," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• "Epistemic Permissiveness," forthcoming, Philosophical Perspectives.
• "Why Favour Simplicity?," Analysis 65 (2005): 205-210.
• "Explanation as a Guide to Induction," Philosophers' Imprint 5 (2005): 1-29.
• "The Epistemic Advantage of Prediction Over Accommodation," Mind 112 (2003): 654-683.
  
• Michael Williams, Johns Hopkins University
• "Doing without Imeediate Justification," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 202-216.
• Problems of Knowledge: a Critical Introduction to Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2001.
• "Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards," Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 1-23.
  
• "Are There Two Grades of Knowledge? Mythology of the Given: Sosa, Sellars and the Task of Epistemology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2003, Supplemental 77, pp. 91-112; and in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 174-189.
• "Rorty on Knowledge and Truth," in C. Guignon, ed., Richard Rorty, Cambridge UP, 2003; pp. 61-80.
• "Nozick on Knowledge and Skepticism," in D. Schmidtz, ed., Robert Nozick (Cambridge UP, 2002), pp. 131-154.
• "Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards," Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 1-23.
• "Is Contextualism Stable?," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 80-85.
• "Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 607-612.
• "Epistemology and the Mirror of Nature," in Brandom, ed., Rorty and His Critics (Cambridge UP, 2000).
• "Scepticism," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 35-69.
• "Fogelin's Neo-Pyrrhonism," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1999): 141-158.
• "Still Unnatural: A Reply to Vogel and Rorty," Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997): 29-39.
• "Understanding Human Knowledge Philosophically," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 359-378.
• Timothy Williamson, Oxford University
• “Knowledge, Context and the Agent’s Point of View,” forthcoming in G. Preyer and G. Peter, Contextualism in Philosophy (Oxford UP).
• “Knowledge and Scepticism,” forthcoming in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy (Oxford UP).
• “Probabilistic Anti-Luminosity,” forthcoming in Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology: New Philosophical Essays (Oxford UP).
• “Can Cognition Be Factorised into Internal and External Components?,” forthcoming in R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Oxford: Blackwell).
• “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge,” Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 213-235.
• “Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement,” Dialectica 58 (2004): 109-153.
• “Sosa on Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism,” in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004): 263-271.
• “Some Computational Constraints in Epistemic Logic,” in D. Gabbay, S. Rahman, J. M. Torres and J. P. van Bendegem, eds., Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science (Hermes, 2004): 437-456.
• “Computational Limits and Epistemic Logic,” in W. Löffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief: Wissen und Glauben (Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna: ÖBV-HPT, 2004): 126-140.
• "Understanding and Inference," The Aristotelian Society, Sup. vol. 77 (2003): 249-293.
  
• with Jason Stanley, "Knowing How," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-444.
• "Comments on Michael Williams 'Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards'," Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 25-33.
• Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford UP, 2000.
• "Précis of Knowledge and its Limits," pp. 431-435 and "Replies to Commentators," pp. 468-491, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005).
  
• "Summary of Knowledge and its Limits," pp. 283-284; and "Replies to commentators," pp. 313-323, Philosophical Books 45 (2004).
  
• "Scepticism, Semantic Externalism and Keith's Mom," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 149-158.
• "Scepticism and Evidence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 613-628.
• "Schiffer on the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 505-517.
• "Conditionalizing on Knowledge," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(1998): 89-121.
• "The Broadness of the Mental: Some Logical Considerations", Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998).
• "Knowledge as Evidence," Mind 106 (1997): 717-741.
• "Knowing and Asserting," Philosophical Review105 (1996): 489-523.
• "Cognitive Homelessness," Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 554-573.
• "'Self-knowledge and embedded operators," Analysis 56 (1996): 202-209.
• "Is Knowing a State of Mind?", Mind 104 (1995): 533-565.
• "Does Assertibility Satisfy the "S4" Axiom?," Critica 1995; 27(1995): 3-25.
• Nicholas Wolterstorff, Yale University (emeritus)
• "Obligation, Entitlement, and Rationality," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 326-338.
• Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (Cambridge UP, 2001).
• "Epistemology of Religion," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 303-324.
• "Obligations of Belief: Two Concepts," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, 1997.
• John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge UP, 1996).
• Crispin Wright, New York University and University of St. Andrews.
• "Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity and Surreptitiously Raising Standards," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 236-262.
• "(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 330-348.
• with Bob Hale, "Benacerraf's Dilemma Revisited," European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002): 101-129.
• "On Basic Logical Knowledge," Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 41-85.
• "Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof" (pp. 140-163) and "Replies [to Garcia Suarez, Hale, and Sainsbury]" (pp. 201-219), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
• with B. Hale, "Implicit Definition and the A Priori," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 286-319.
• Stephen Yablo, MIT
• "Apriority and Existence," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 197-228.
• "Self-Knowledge and Semantic Luck," Philosophical Issues 9 (1998).
• Linda Zagzebski, University of Oklahoma
• "Epistemic Value Monism," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 190-198.
  
• ed., with M. DePaul, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford UP, 2003.
• “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good,” Metaphilosophy, 2003; to be reprinted in D. Pritchard and M. Brady, ed., Moral and Epistemic Virtues.
• “Emotion and Moral Judgment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003.
• "Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief and the Aquinas/Calvin Model," (symposium paper), Philosophical Books, 2002.
• ed., with A. Fairweather, Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford UP, 2001.
• "From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 173-179.
• "What is Knowledge?" in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 92-116.
• "Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (Supp., 1997): 1-17.
• Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into The Nature Of Virtue And The Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge UP, 1996).
• "Précis" (pp. 169-177) and "Responses" (pp. 207-219), Symposium on L. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000).
• José Zalabardo, University College London
• "Wright on Moore," forthcoming in A. Coliva, ed., Wittgenstein, Epistemology and Mind: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright (Oxford UP).
• "BonJour, Externalism and the Regress Problem," Synthese 148 (2006): 135-169.
• "Externalism, Skepticism and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," Philosophical Review 114 (2005): 33-61.
  

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5. Other Epistemology sites:

• Certain Doubts (a blog hopelessly devoted to epistemology)
• Keith Korcz's EpistemologicalResearch.html   .
• Episteme Links' Epistemology Topics Page  .

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Last modified 14 July 2006
Keith DeRose

visitors to my web site since 6/8/03