My goal is to pull together some resources in epistemology. I have very limited time for maintaining this page, so it is bound to be very incomplete. Hopefully, though, there will be enough material here for the page to be somewhat useful to those interested in epistemology.

When I started using hit meters on this page, I became aware of the fact that this page gets a lot of internet traffic, much of it apparently from surfers who are referred here from Google searches, mainly on the term "epistemology." I suspect many of those surfers are looking for more basic information than I provide here.  Indeed, many are probably seeking a fairly basic answer to the question "What is epistemology?", and/or basic introductory material on what the main topics in the field are, while this page is intended as a research aid for those who already have a pretty good idea of what epistemology is.
So, for those looking for more basic information, see: What Is Epistemology?  A Brief Introduction to the Topic.

Also On-Line: Contextualism in Epistemology - A Bibliography.  .

Contents:

1. Collections and anthologies

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Around the turn of the century (and of the millennium), a few collections of epistemology papers came out, which provided excellent entries into the field.  These collections are now several years old, and so no longer provide such a cutting-edge-recent introductions to what's going on now in epistemology.  But keeping in mind that one will have to also investigate what's been happening in the last few years, these are still useful enough for students interested in the field that I will list them here.

-Philosophical Perspectives is an annual which is on a different topic every year; 1999 was epistemology's turn (vol. 13).  This volume has many papers, many of them by the "usual suspects" in the field.  A student who wanted to get up on the recent state of epistemology (at least as of 1999) would do well to start with this volume, find some topics that interested her, and then trace the trail of citations back to find other literature on those topics.  Blackwell Publishers now includes Philosophical Perspectives as a supplement to their journal Noûs.  To view the contents or to order, see Blackwell's site here, or you can order through Amazon.com by clicking here.

-Another good entry to the field is the Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (1999).  The editors of that volume, John Greco and Ernest Sosa, commisioned various epistemologists to write seventeen "survey articles," each one on a major area of epistemology.  But in addition to describing the current state of each sub-field, each article also sought to advance the topic.  The description on the Blackwell web page: "Each essay in the volume incorporates background material serving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic; as well as new material by a leading author in the field."  (Barnes & Noble.com, Amazon.com)

-Another collection of recent work in epistemology is the Epistemology volume (volume 5) of the Proceedings of 20th World Congress of Philosophy.

-Vol. 10 (2000) of Philosophical Issues is on Skepticism.

-Vol. 14 (2004) of  Philosophical Issues is on epistemology generally.

And here are some not-so-recent-but not-all-that-old collections:

• Philosophical Topics 23 (1995).
• Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988).
• Philosophical Topics 14 (1986).
• Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980).

The above were all collections of previously unpublished papers.  The following are recent (you'll be hard-pressed to find undergrads younger than these collections) anthologies of previously published epistemology papers.

• L. Alcoff, ed., Epistemology: The Big Questions (Blackwell Publishers, 1998).
• S. Bernecker, F. Dretske, ed., Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2000).
• K. DeRose and T. Warfield, ed., Skepticism (Oxford UP, 1999).
• M. Huemer, ed., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002)
• P. Ludlow, N. Martin, ed., Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications, 1998).
• H. Kornblith, ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Blackwell Publishers, 2001).
• L. Pojman, Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 3rd ed. (Wadsworth, 2003).
• E. Sosa, J. Kim, ed., Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

Finally, teachers of introductory epistemology classes often like to teach from an epistemology textbook.  As it happens, I haven't taught a beginning epistemology class in quite a few years, and even when I did teach such a course, I taught from an anthology, so I can't really speak to which are the better textbooks.  But here are some that have been suggested to me (hopefully, I'll be able to get links up to them soon):

Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 2003).

Laurence BonJour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell, 1985).

Richard Feldman, Epistemology (Prentice Hall, 2003).

Stephen Hetherington, Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology (Westview Press, 1996).

Charles Landesman, An Introduction to Epistemology (Blackwell, 1997).

Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Westview Press, 1990).

Adam Morton, A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Blackwell, 2002).

Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed., (Wadsworth, 2001).

John Pollack, Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd Ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

Matthias Steup, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Prentice-Hall, 1996).

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2. Some Epistemology courses with Syllabi / Helpful Information On-Line:

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3. Graduate Programs strong in epistemology -- updated April '06

First of all, instead of asking me, you should check out Brian Leiter's Philosophical Gourmet Report, which is a good resource for anyone interested in graduate work in philosophy.  Particularly helpful is Leiter's "Breakdown of Programs by Specialties" which, for many particular areas of philosophy, including epistemology, ranks departments by how strong they are in that area.  In the previous (2002-04) PGR, those area evaluations were arrived at through e-mail discussions of the members of the PGR advisory board that worked in the area in question.  This time around (2004-06), the area rankings were determined by a survey of experts in the field -- where the group of experts was quite a bit broader than just the advisory board members that did the rankings last time around.  Here are the top 6 in epistemology, according to the PGR: Rutgers is listed all by itself in Group 1, Oxford is listed by itself in Group 2, and in Group 3 we find (listed alphabetically) Brown, New York University, Princeton, and U of Notre Dame.  Those results seemed fairly sound to me when they came out.  (Follow the link above to see the rest of the departments that get ranked below those 6.)  But there have been significant changes since the latest PGR came out.  Here are some further thoughts about the relevant departments, and also some discussion of the impact of recent changes. 

Boasting several very prominent epistemologists on its faculty, Rutgers was well-chosen as the top program in epistemology.  Alvin Goldman, Peter Klein, Ernest Sosa, and Stephen Stich constitute a formidable line-up of senior epistemologists.  Additionally, and importantly, Rutgers also has several excellent faculty members who, though epistemology is not their main area of research, have done or do good work in the area: Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, Brian McLaughlin, and Jason Stanley.  A graduate student could easily put together an outstanding dissertation committee for a wide variety of dissertation topics in epistemology at Rutgers.  However, since the last PGRs, there have been several changes in Rutgers's faculty, the net effect of which are probably a bit to the negative side for epistemology.  First, the positive: On the faculty lists on which the last PGRs were based, Sosa was listed as part-time at Rutgers because he was splitting time between Brown and Rutgers, but, as reported here, Sosa will be moving to full-time at Rutgers, beginning in January 2007.  Now the negative: First, as reported here, Colin McGinn has left Rutgers for the University of Miami.  McGinn was not primarily an epistemologist, but he had done some prominent work in the area.  Second, as reported here, John Hawthorne is leaving Rutgers.  Actually, this might not hurt Rutgers relative to the last PGRs as much as one might initially think, because, while Hawthorne was on Rutgers's faculty list for the last PGRs, much of his reputation in epistemology is based on recent work that has come out since those surveys were done -- especially his book, Knowledge and Lotteries.   It's hard to measure the net effect of those changes, but my best guess is that it all works out to a slight negative for Rutgers.  But though the negative effect, if any, is slight, Rutgers's standing as the by-themselves-tops in epistemology is more questionable than it was when the last PGRs were done because their loss of Hawthorne was to their chief rival in epistemology...

Oxford University features Timothy Williamson, one of the world's top epistemologists and author of Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford UP, 2000), one of the best and most important books in epistemology in recent years.  (In fact, in my view, that's a bit of an understatement: I'm on record as saying KAIL is the best book in epistemology to come out since 1975.)  Also at Oxford is Ralph Wedgwood who has written some excellent papers in epistemology, and several other faculty who have episemology as an area of interest.  And now John Hawthorne will be going to Oxford.  Adding another prominent epistemologist helps Oxford quite a bit in the area -- and helps them a lot more than it hurts Rutgers, since Rutgers still has many top epistemologists left even after Hawthorne's departure.  Will the result of all the changes be that Oxford moves up into Group 1, along with Rutgers?  That's hard for me to predict.  When I had learned of Hawthorne's deciding to go to Oxford, but had not yet heard of Sosa's moving to full-time status as Rutgers, my very tentative guess was that there would be such a co-grouping.  Now, with Sosa's change in status, I'm more uncertain than ever.

NYU will probably (and should probably) be moving ahead of the other programs they were listed along with in Group 3 of the last PGRs, with the possible exception of Notre Dame.  Their epistemology team is anchored by three excellent senior epistemologists, Paul Bogghossian, Richard Foley, and James Pryor.  Foley is serving as a Dean at NYU, as well as being a member of the philosophy department, so there is no doubt very stiff competition for his time and energy.  (A look at Foley's recent publishing record, however, shows that he has remained very active in his epistemological writing, despite his duties as Dean.)  But Pryor has been added since the last PGRs, coming to NYU from Princeton, as reported here.  This is big boost to NYU in epistemology, as Pryor is one of the most prominent of the younger-tenured epistemologists.  NYU also has Crispin Wright listed on their web page as a "regular visitor," but he probably shouldn't count too much because my PGR survey has him listed as only quarter-time at NYU.  Importantly, NYU also has some other outstanding philosophers who, though epistemology might not be among their current main area of research, would be very good to work with there.  Peter Unger, though he now works mainly in other areas, used to be primarily an epistemologist (and an excellent one, too: there's a reason why I picked 1975 as the year since which Williamson's KAIL is the best epistemology book: I'd pick Unger's '75 skeptical treatise, Ignorance, as the best book in epistemology since I-don't-know(!)-when).  And, very notably, Roger White has done some excellent recent work in epistemology.  In fact, White's recent work has been tending toward epistemology enough that he should perhaps be counted as among NYU's excellent epistemologists, and not just as an excellent philosopher who occasionally works in the area.  And there are several other faculty members at NYU whom I think it would be very exciting to work with in epistemology.  Hartry Field's important work often takes him deeply into epistemological territory, and he could be an excellent guide to some of this territory.  And, though they don't list epistemology as one of their areas (at least on NYU's faculty web page), Stephen Schiffer and Thomas Nagel have each done some fairly recent work there. Some may reasonably think that NYU may rival Oxford, or perhaps even Rutgers, in epistemology.  (I should divulge that I may be biased in favor of NYU: My first job was there, and I know some of the people there very well.  Still, I think my advice here is sound.)

Notre Dame's epistemology team is anchored by Alvin Plantinga, whose old (1980s) work in religious epistemology proved to be provocative and important, and whose recent trilogy of books in epistemology -- Warrant: The Current Debate (1993), Warrant and Proper Function (1993), and Warranted Christian Belief (2000) -- constitute one of the major achievments in the field in recent years.  Joining Plantinga recently (but in time for this change to have been already figured into the last PGRs) is Robert Audi, an epistemologist who has done a lot of important work in the area, and who was hired away from Nebraska, and an exciting team of considerably younger tenured epistemologists: Marian David, Michael Depaul, Leopold Stubenberg, and Ted Warfield.

Gilbert Harman and James Pryor were Princeton epistemology's dynamic duo.  With Pryor having left for NYU, look for Princeton to drop noticeably in the next PGR epistemology rankings.  Princeton did hire Tom Kelly away from Notre Dame since the last PGRs, however -- though this was settled in time that Kelly was already on Princeton's faculty list for the most recent PGRs.  Though untenured at this point, Kelly seems to be an excellent young epistemologist with some first-rate papers to his name already. 

Brown, too, should fall very noticeably.  Christopher Hill, an excellent senior epistemologist, remains.  But much of Brown's reputation in the area no doubt derived from the presence of Ernest Sosa, one of the leading epistemologists in the country, who has now moved full-time to Rutgers.  Sosa was already splitting time between Brown and Rutgers when the last PGRs were done, but he was listed normally (rather than part-time) at Brown (and part-time at Rutgers), so Brown is likely to be hurt quite badly by this change.  Also, James Van Cleve, who is not primarily an epistemologist, but who has done some important and excellent work in the area, had been listed as splitting time between Brown and USC, but will now be full-time at USC, as reported here.  Remaining at Brown, however, is Jaegwon Kim, who, like Van Cleve, has done some important work in epistemology, though it isn't his main area.

Fordham University was listed in the most recent PGR epistemology evaluations as one of two programs that, though they were not part of the PGR survey, were programs that in the judgment of the PGR epistemology advisory board ought to be considered by students interested in epistemology -- largely on the strength of the presence of John Greco.  And since that latest PGR, Fordham has added Bryan Frances, much of whose recent work has been in epistemology.  Update 5/11/06: It is now reported that Greco will be leaving Fordham to go to Saint Louis University.  UC-Davis, which has hired Stephen Hartmann and Jonathan Vogel since the last PGR surveys were done, will probably (or at least should probably) be moving into a group with the departments currently listed in Group 5 in epistemology, or possibly with those currently in Group 4. 

For the most part, and unsurprisingly, the top departments in epistemology tend to also be among the top programs overall in philosophy.  Consider the programs that were in the last PGR's top 6 (Groups 1-3) in epistemology.  Rutgers, NYU, Oxford, and Princeton are all good enough overall that they arguably constitute the top 4 philosophy departments in the English-speaking world, and are certainly at least not too far from that; Notre Dame is several slots behind them, and Brown still several more.  For prospective epistemology students, that's both good news and bad.  Good because it's important to go to a program with good over-all strength, and not just one good in your own area of specialization.  Bad because, being among the very top programs, they are no doubt highly selective in admissions and therefore tough to get into.  (Going just by over-all ranking -- and I don't have much else to go by here -- Notre Dame and, even more so, Brown, might be a bit easier to get into than the other four.)  Prospective students interested in epistemology are therefore well-advised to also look into other programs strong in epistemology; see the list of strong programs in the PGR, following the above links.

But in choosing a program for epistemology, whether it's one of the "top 6" mentioned above, or one of the Group 4 or Group 5 programs listed in the PGR, or one of the programs that didn't make the lists, much will depend, of course, on how well your approach, style, and particular interests match up with the faculty at the various programs.  On that score, you might do well to read some of the published papers of the relevant faculty, and find someone whose work interests you.  As a start, you can check out the depatments' and individuals' web sites, to which I've provided some links (in this section, for some of the departments [for other departments, you can use my list of links to philosophy programs with PhD programs], and below for many of the individual epistemologists).  Unfortunately, you will find that, believe it or not, very many philosophers, including very many from departments with graduate programs, don't even bother to post their CVs or a reasonably complete list of publications on-line!  Still, many do, and one can get quite a bit of helpful information on-line. 

Hope this is of some help, future colleagues in epistemology.  Remember that it's just one epistemologist's opinion.  Talk to your adivsors about it.

Epistemologists on the Move.  The following significant moves of epistemologists were announced after the latest PGR rankings, and so weren't taken account of in those rankings:

• George Bealer: Left the University of Texas for Yale University; began at Yale in Fall of '05.
• Michael Bishop: Presently at Northern Illinois, but has accepted an offer to move to Florida State
  
• Bryan Frances: Left Leeds for Fordham; began at Fordham in the Fall of '05
• Tamar Gendler: Will be leaving Cornell to start at Yale in the Fall of '06
• John Greco: Will be leaving Fordham to go to Saint Louis University.
• Stephen Hartmann: Presently at LSE; has accepted an offer to UC-Davis.
  
• John Hawthorne: Presently at Rutgers University, but has accepted an offer at Oxford University.
• Jonathan Kvanvig: Presently at Missouri, but has accepted an offer to go to Baylor.
• Keith Lehrer: Presently at Arizona, has accepted a Resarch Professorship at Miami; some details here.
  
• James Pryor: Left Princeton University for NYU, began at NYU in the Fall of '05.
• Sherrilyn Roush: Presently at Rice, but has accepted an offer to go to UC-Berkeley.
  
• Ernest Sosa: Has been splitting time between Brown and Rutgers, but will be moving to full-time status at Rutgers and leaving Brown, starting January of '07.
• Jonathan Vogel: Presently at Amherst College; has accepted an offer at UC-Davis, to begin there in the Fall of '06.
  

4. Some Epistemologists and Some of Their Epistemological Publications (since 1995)

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This list is far from exhaustive. I add publications and epistemologists willy-nilly as I come across them or as they're suggested to me.  (So if an epistemology paper of yours isn't listed, or if you're an epistemologist who isn't listed, don't conclude that I've looked at your paper, or at you, but judged them or you unworthy to be included in this index.  It may well even be that I did see your paper and loved it, but didn't have my computer handy at the time, and then didn't remember you & your paper when I did get around to revising this page.)  Still, many have e-mailed to tell me that they find this list very helpful, despite its limitations.  Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the list are the links to various epistemologists' homepages, where you can often find a much more complete description of their epistemological (and other) work (including pre-1995 papers). A few epistemologists are listed without any papers listed below their names.  This is because I'm not aware of any epistemology they've published since 1995.  In each such case, they've done important epistemology in the past, so it was worth providing a link to their home page, where one can often find references to those golden oldies.

A . C . F . H . K . M . R . T

• Fred Adams, University of Deleware
• "Tracking Theories of Knowledge," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 11-35.
  
• with M. Clarke, "Resurrecting the Tracking Theories," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 207-221.
• "Knowledge," in Floridi, ed., The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 228-236.
• with M. Clarke, "Toward Saving Nozick from Kripke," in W. Loffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg: The Austrian Wittgenstein Society, 2003).
• "Epistemology," in McHenry, Yagisawa, eds., Reflections on Philosophy, 2nd Edition (Longman Press, 2003), pp. 81-101.
• "Epistemic Engineering Audi-Style," in J. Heil, ed., Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark Carl Overvold (Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), pp. 49-58.
  
• Jonathan Adler, Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center
• "Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio," Pacific  Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 445-458.
  
• "Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 37-52.
• "Reconciling Open-Mindedness and Belief ," Theory and Research in Education 2 (2004): 127-142.
  
• "The Revisability Paradox," Philosophical Forum 34 (2003): 383-389.
• Belief's Own Ethics, MIT Press, 2002.
  
• "Akratic Believing?," Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 1-27.
• with M. Levin, "Is the Generality Problem too General?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 87-97.
• "The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 267-285.
• "Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 891-905.
• "An Overlooked Argument for Epistemic Conservatism," Analysis 56 (1996): 80-84.
• "Transmitting Knowledge," Noûs 30 (1996): 99-111.
• Scott Aikin, Vanderbilt University
• "Modest Evidentialism," forthcoming, International Philosophical Quarterly.
• "Contrastive Self Attribution of Belief," forthcoming, Social Epistemology.
  
• "Who Is Afraid of Epistemology's Regress Problem?", Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 191-217.
• Linda Alcoff, Syracuse University
• ed., Epistemology: The Big Questions (Blackwell, 1999).
• "On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?", Philosophic Exchange 29 (1999): 73-89.
• Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory of Knowledge (Cornell UP, 1996).
• "Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?", Philosophic Exchange 26 (1996): 59-79.
• Robert F. Almeder, Georgia State University
• "Recent Work on Error," Philosophia 27 (1999): 3-58.
• Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy (Open Court, 1998).
• "Carnap and Quine on Empiricism," History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (1997): 349-364.
• "Dretske's Dreadful Question" (pp. 449-457) and "Externalism and Justification" (pp. 465-469), Philosophia 24 (1995).
• William P. Alston, Syracuse University (emeritus)
• "Perception and Representation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 253-289.
  
• "Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief," in M. Peterson, ed., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 135-145.
• "Sellars and the 'Myth of the Given'," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 69-86.
• "Back to the Theory of Appearing," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 181-203.
• "Perceptual Knowledge," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 223-242.
• "What is Distinctive About the Epistemology of Religious Belief?" Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. IV, Philosophies of Religion, Art, and Creativity.
• "Chisholm on the Epistemology of Perception," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (Open-Court 1997).
• "Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith," in J. Jordan, ed., Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
• D.M. Armstrong, University of Sydney
• "A Naturalist Program: Epistemology and Ontology," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 77-89.
• Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame
• "The Epistemic Authority of Testimony and the Ethics of Belief," in A. Chignell and A. Dole, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 175-201.
• "Intellectual Virtue and Epistemic Power," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 3-16.
  
• The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality (Oxford UP, 2001)
• Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge UP, 2000)
• "Self-Evidence," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 205-228.
• "Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 271-302.
•  Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Routledge, 1998).
• Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford, 1997).
• "The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 405-422.
• "Perceptual Experience, Doxastic Practice, and the Rationality of Religious Commitment," Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 1-18.
• Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
• Guy Axtel, University of Nevada, Reno
• “Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology,” Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 331-352.
• "Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues," in Fairweather & Zagzebski, ed., Virtue Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002).
• ed., Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
• "Virtue Theory and the Fact/Value Problem," in Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology.
• "The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of Epistemology," The Monist 81 (1998): 353-370.
• "Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 1-26.
• "Epistemic Virtue-Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology?" The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10 (1996): 172-198.
• Dorit Bar-On , University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
• Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Oxford UP, 2004.
• "Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression," Noûs 38 (2004): 430-455.
• "Avowals and First-Person Privilege" (with D. Long), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 311-335.
• "Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge," Synthese 106 (1996): 139-166.
• George Bealer, Yale University
  
• "The Origins of Modal Error," Dialectica 58 (2004): 11-42.
  
• "Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance," in Gendler, Hawthorne, eds., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 71-125.
• "A Priori Knowledge," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 1-12.
• "A Theory Of The A Priori," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 29-55.
• "The A Priori," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 243-270.
• "Intuition and The Autonomy of Philosophy," in DePaul, Ramsey, eds., Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 201-239.
• "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy" (pp. 121-142) and "A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa" (pp. 163-174), Philosophical Studies 81 (1996).
• "On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge," Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 1-34.
• James R. Beebe, SUNY-Buffalo
  
• "BonJour's Arguments Against Skepticism About the A Priori," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• "Reliabilism and Deflationism," forthcoming), Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
  
• "Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth," forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
• "The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis," Noûs 38 (2004): 177-195.
  
• "Reliabilism, Truetemp and New Perceptual Faculties," Synthese 140 (2004): 307-329.
• "Interpretation and Epistemic Evaluation in Goldman's Descriptive Epistemology," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (2001): 163-186.
  
• Michael Bergmann, Purdue University
• Justification Without Awareness, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2006.
  
• “Reidian Externalism,” in V. Hendricks, D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology (Ashgate Publishing, forthcoming).
  
• “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 419-36.
  
• “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 709-27.
  
• “Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?”, forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• “BonJour’s Dilemma,” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
• “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements,” forthcoming, The Philosophical Quarterly.
  
• “Externalist Justification Without Reliability,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), 35-60.
• "What's Not Wrong With Foundationalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 161-65 .
  
• "Externalism and Skepticism," Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 159-94. .
• "Deontology and Defeat," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 87-102
• "Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition," Synthese 110 (1997): 399-417.
• Sven Bernecker, University of Manchester
• “Prospects of Epistemic Compatibilism,” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
• Reading Epistemology, Blackwell, forthcoming 2005.
• “Rule-Following Made Easy,” in W. Löffler, P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief (öbv-hpt, 2004): 63-69.
• “Believing That You Know And Knowing That You Believe,” in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge (de Gruyter 2004): 369-376.
• “Impliziert Erinnerung Wissen?”, in T. Grundmann, ed., Erkenntnistheorie (Mentis Verlag 2001): 145-64.
• Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. with Fred Dretske (Oxford University Press 2000).
• “Knowing the World by Knowing One’s Mind,” Synthese 123 (2000): 1-34.
• “Self-Knowledge and Closure,” in P. Ludlow, N. Martin, eds., Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications 1998): 333-349.
• “Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge,” Nous 30 (1996): 262-275.
• “Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism,” Inquiry 39 (1996): 121-139.
  
• Michael A. Bishop, Northern Illinois University --> Florida State University
  
• with J.D. Trout. “The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology,” forthcoming, Nous.
• with J.D. Trout, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Oxford UP, 2005.
• with J.D. Trout, "Epistemology’s Search for Significance," Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15 (2003): 203-216.
• with S. Downes, “The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist or Social Institution,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 33 (2002): 121-136.
• with R. Samuels and S. Stich, “Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Normative Disputes about Cognitive Illusions Disappear,” in R. Elio, ed., Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality, Oxford UP, 2002.
  
• "In Praise of Epistemic Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be?," Synthese 122 (2000): 179-208.
• “Why Thought Experiments are Not Arguments,” Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): 534-541.
• “An Epistemological Role for Thought Experiments,” in N. Shanks, ed., Idealization IX: Idealization in Contemporary Physics, Poznan Studies in Philosophy of Science and Humanities Bookseries, Rodopi, 1998.
  
• Tim Black, California State University, Fresno
• with P. Murphy, “Avoiding the Dogmatic Commitments of Contextualism,” forthcoming, Grazer Philosophische Studien.
• “Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism,” forthcoming in V.F. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, ed., New Waves in Epistemology (Ashgate, 2005).
• with P. Murphy, “In Defense of Sensitivity,” forthcoming, Synthese.
• “The Distinction Between Coherence and Constancy in Hume’s Treatise I.iv.2”, forthcoming, The British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
  
• "Classical Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manoeuvres," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 328-336.
• “The Relevant Alternatives Theory and Missed Clues,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 96-106.
• "A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 148-163.
• "Relevant Alternatives and the Shifting Standards for Knowledge," Southwest Philosophy Review18 (2002): 23-32.
• Michael Blome-Tillmann, Oxford University
• "The Indexicality of 'Knowledge'," forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.
  
• "A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism," forthcoming, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
  
• "Coherentism and Foundationalism From A Contextualist Point of View," in W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2003, 42-43.
• "What's Wrong With Sceptical Invariantism?," in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz, eds., Selected Papers Contributed to GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy, Bielefeld, 22-26 September 2003, Paderborn: mentis, 157-68.
  
• Paul Boghossian, New York University
• Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford UP, forthcoming, 2006.
  
• "Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense," Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (2003): 15-35.
  
• "Blind Reasoning," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 77 (2003): 225-248
• "Inference and Insight," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 633-640
  
• "How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?", Philosophical Studies 106 (2001): 1-40.
• edited, with C. Peacocke, New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford UP, 2000.
• "Knowledge of Logic," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 229-254.
• "What the Externalist Can Know A Priori," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1997): 161-175.
• Laurence BonJour, University of Washington, Seattle
• "In Defense of the A Priori," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 98-105.
• "In Search of Direct Realism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 349-367.
  
• with Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
  
• "Four Theses Concerning A Priori Justification," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 13-20.
• "Foundationalism and the External World," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 229-249.
• "The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 117-142.
• In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification, Cambridge UP, 1998.
• "Précis" (pp. 625-631) and "Replies" (pp. 673-698), Symposium on In Defense of Pure Reason, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001).
• "Haack on Justification and Experience," Synthese 112 (1997): 13-23.
• "Plantinga on Knowledge and Proper Function," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 47-71.
• "Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness," Philosophical Studies 78 (1995): 207-220.
• Nick Bostrom, Oxford University
• “The Simulation Argument: Reply to Brian Weatherson,” Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 90-97.
• “Are You Living In A Computer Simulation?”, Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 243-255.
  
• Luc Bovens, London School of Economics and Political Science
• with S. Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
• with S. Hartmann, "Why There Cannot Be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence," forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
• with S. Hartmann, "Coherence and the Role of Specificity: A Response to Meijs and Douven," Mind 114 (2005).
• with E. Olsson, "Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions," Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 137-150.
• with S. Hartmann, "Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments," Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 29-73.
• with S. Leeds, "The Epistemology of Social Facts: The Evidential Value of Personal Experience versus Testimony," in G. Meggle, ed., Social Facts and Collective Intentionality (Frankfurt a.M., 2002).
• with E. Olsson, "Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks," Mind 109 (2000): 685-719.
• with J. Hawthorne, "The Preface, the Lottery and the Logic of Belief," Mind 108 (1999): 241-264.
• "Do Beliefs Supervene on Degrees of Confidence?", in A. Meigers, ed., Belief, Cognition and the Will (Tilburg University Press, 1999).
• "Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998): 79-101.
• "'P and I Will Believe that Not-P': Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief," Mind 104 (1995): 737-760.
• David Braun, University of Rochester
  
• Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations," Nous 34 (2000): 203-236.
  
• "Understanding Belief Reports," Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 555-595..
  
• Bill Brewer, University of Warwick
• "Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 217-230.
• "Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical Facts," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 415-432.
• "Self-Knowledge and Externalism," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 39-47.
• Perception and Reason (Oxford UP, 1999).
• "Précis" (pp. 405-416) and "Replies" (pp. 449-464), Symposium on Perception and Reason, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001).
• "Experience and Reason in Perception" in A. O'Hear, ed., Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge UP, 1998).
• "Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge," American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 41-55.
• "Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge," European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996): 259-275.
• "Mental Causation II," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volume 69 (1995): 237-253.
• Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri, St. Louis -- blog: Lemmings.
  
• with J. Salerno, “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle,” forthcoming, American Philosophical Quarterly.
• with J. Salerno, “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” forthcoming in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., New Waves in Epistemology, Ashgate.
• "Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem," Synthese 139 (2004): 367-386.
• "Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 351-370.
• "Adhoccery in Epistemology," Philosophical Papers 32 (2003): 65-82.
• with J. Salerno, "Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant," Analysis 62 (2002): 143-150.
• "Peirce on Abduction and Rational Control," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (1999): 129-155.
  
• Audre Jean Brokes, Saint Josephs's University
• "What Does the Generality Problem Show?", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 145-156.
• Fernando Broncano, University of Salamanca, Spain
• "Reliable Rationality," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 49-59.
• Jessica Brown, University of Bristol
• "Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism?," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 263-285.
• "Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 319-327.
• "Anti-Individualism and Agnosticism," Analysis 61 (2001): 213-224.
• "Critical Reasoning, Understanding and Self-Knowledge", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 659-676.
• "Reliabilism, Knowledge and Mental Content", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 115-135.
• "Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access," Analysis 59 (1999): 52-59.
• "The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access," Analysis 55 (1995): 149-156.
• Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barabara
• "Contexualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 315-318.
• "Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 53-64.
• "Williamson on the Primeness of Knowing," Analysis 62 (2002): 197-202.
• "Anti-Individualism and Analyticity," Analysis 62 (2002): 87-91.
• "Bonjour's A Priori Justification of Induction," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 1-10.
• "A Priori Knowledge of the World Not Easily Available," Philosophical Studies 104 (2001): 109-114.
• "Klein on Closure and Skepticism," Philosophical Studies 98 (2000): 139-151.
• "Externalism and the A Prioricity of Self-Knowledge," Analysis 60 (2000): 132-136.
• "Ambiguity and Knowledge of Content," Analysis 60 (2000): 257-260.
• "Two Recent Approaches to Self-Knowledge," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 251-271.
• "The Super-Omnicient Interpreter," Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 526-528.
• "Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism," in R. Stern, ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Oxford UP, 1999.
• "Difficulties in Generating Scepticism about Knowledge of Content," Analysis 59 (1999): 59-63.
• "Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 361-364.
• "Closure and Context," Ratio 11 (1998): 78-82.
• "Externalism and Memory," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997): 1-12.
• "Is Scepticism about Self-Knowledge Incoherent?", Analysis 57 (1997): 287-290.
• "Deontologism and Internalism in Epistemology," Nous 30 (1996): 527-536.
• "Trying to Get Outside Your Own Skin," Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 79-111.
• "Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference," Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 199-201.
• Tyler Burge, University of California, Los Angeles
• "Perceptual Entitlement," Philosophy and Phenomonelogical Research 67 (2003): 503-548
• "Frege on Apriority," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 11-42.
• "A Century of Deflation and a Moment About Self-Knowledge," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 25-46.
• "Frege on Knowing the Foundation," Mind 107 (1998): 305-347.
• "Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds," Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998).
• "Interlocution, Perception, and Memory," Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 21-47.
• "Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 91-116.
• "Frege on Knowing the Third Realm" in Schirn, ed., Frege: Importance and Legacy (De Gruyter, 1996)
• Panayot Butchvarov, University of Iowa
• Skepticism About the External World (Oxford UP, 1998).
• Keith Butler, Western Washington University
• "Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 773-800.
• Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• "Perception and Conceptual Content," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 231-250.
• "How Hard are the Sceptical Paradoxes?", Noûs 38 (2004): 299-325.
• Joseph Camp, University of Pittsburgh
• Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge, Harvard UP, 2002
• James Cargile, University of Virginia
• "The Fallacy of Epistemicism," forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
  
• "Scepticism and Possibilities," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000).
• "On an Argument against Closure," Nous 33 (1999): 239-246.
• "The Problem of Induction," Philosophy 73 (1998): 247-275.
• "Justification and Misleading Defeaters," Analysis 55 (1995): 216-220.
• Peter Carruthers, University of Maryland
• "Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of Theory-Theory," in P.Carruthers and P.K. Smith, eds.,
• Theories of Theories of Mind (Cambridge UP, 1996), pp. 22-38.
• Quassim Cassam, Oxford University
• "Rationalism, Empiricism, and the A Priori," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 43-64.
• "Mind, Knowledge and Reality: Themes from Kant," in O'Hear, ed., Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge UP, 1998.
• "Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of Misconception," European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996): 276-295.
• Albert Casullo, University of Nebraska
• A Priori Justification, Oxford UP, 2003.
• "Experience and A Priori Justification," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 665-671.
• "The Coherence of Empiricism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 31-48.
• "Modal Epistemology: Fortune or Virtue?," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 17-25.
• "Is Empiricism Coherent?" Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 61-74.
• ed., A Priori Knowledge (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1999).
• "A Priori Knowledge Appraised," in A. Casullo (ed.), A Priori Knowledge (1999).
• David Chalmers, University of Arizona
• "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief," in Q. Smith, A. Jokic, eds., Aspects of Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2003).
• "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler, J. Hawthorne, eds., Imagination, Conceivability, and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002).
• James Chase, University of Tasmania
  
• "Indicator Reliabilism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 115-137.
• "Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification?", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001): 227-246.
• David Christensen, University of Vermont
• Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief, Oxford UP, 2004.
  
• "Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality," Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 349-371.
• "Measuring Evidence," Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 437 - 461.
• "What is Relative Confirmation?" Noûs 31 (1997): 370 - 384.
• (with H. Kornblith) "Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori," Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 1 - 20.
• "Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers,"Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 450-479.
• Critical Study of Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality, Noûs 29 (1995): 259 - 274.
• Murray Clarke, Concordia University, Montreal
• with F. Adams, "Resurrecting the Tracking Theories," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 207-221.
• Reconstructing Reason and Representation, MIT Press, 2004.
• with Fred Adams, "Toward Saving Nozick from Kripke," in W. Loffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg: The Austrian Wittgenstein Society, 2003).
• "Reliabilism and the Meliorative Project," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 75-82.
• "Knowledge and Indexical Representation," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 178 (1996): 53-62.
• Andrew D. Cling, University of Alabama, Huntsville
• "Justification-Affording Circular Arguments," Philosophical Studies 111 (2002): 251-275
• "Epistemic Levels and the Problem of the Criterion," Philosophical Studies 88 (1997): 109-140.
• Lorraine Code, York University
• "Epistemology," in A. Jaggar, ed., A Companion to Feminist Philosophy (Blackwell, 1998).
• "What is Natural About Epistemology Naturalized?", American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 1-22
• E.J. Coffman, University of Notre Dame
• "Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism," forthcoming, Synthese.
• with D. Howard-Snyder, “Three Arguments against Foundationalism,” forthcoming, Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
  
• Jonathan Cohen, University of California, San Diego
• with P. Magnus, "Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation," Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 37-52
• Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University
• "Contextualism Defended," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 56-62.
• "Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 417-430.
• "Knowledge, Speaker and Subject," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 199-212.
• "Structure and Connection: Comments on Sosa's Epistemology," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 17-21.
• "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 309-329.
• "Contextualism and Skepticism," (pp. 94-107) and "Replies [to Klein, Hawthorne, and Prades]" (pp. 132-139), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
• "Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 57-89.
• "Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1999): 1043-1048.
• "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 289-306.
• "Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research58 (1998): 143-159.
• "Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 913-918.
• Juan Comesaña, University of Wisconsin, Madison
• "We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now," forthcoming, Philosophical Perspectives.
  
• "A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem, forthcoming, Philosophical Studies 129 (2006: 27-47.
  
• "Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: A Case Against Disjunctivism," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Unsafe Knowledge," Synthese 146 (2005):  395-404.
  
• "The Diagonal and the Demon," Philosophical Studies 100 (2002): 249-266.
• Earl Conee, University of Rochester
• "Contextualism Contested," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 47-56.
• with R. Feldman, "Some Virtues of Evidentialism," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 95-108.
• with R. Feldman, Evidentialism, Oxford UP, 2004.
• with R. Feldman, "Typing Problems" (a response to Adler and Levin's "Is the Generality Problem too General?"), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 98-105
• with R. Feldman, "Internalism Defended," American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001):
• "Seeing the Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998).
• with R. Feldman, "The Generality Problem for Reliabilism," Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 1-29.
• "Plantinga's Naturalism," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 183-196.
• Josep E. Corbi, Universitat de Valencia
• "The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 377-385.
• Edward Craig, University of Cambridge
• "Response to Lehrer ['s "Discursive Knowledge"]," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 655-665.
• Thomas Crisp, Biola University
• "Hawthorne on Knowledge and Practical Reasoning," Analysis 65 (2005): 138-140.
• "Gettier and Plantinga's Revised Account of Warrant," Analysis 60 (2000): 42-50.
• Joseph Cruz, Williams College
• with John Pollock, "The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism," in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: Studies on Cognition and Intentionality (New York: de Gruyter, forthcoming).
• with John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd Edition (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
• Jonathan Dancy, University of Reading
• "Arguments from Illusion," Philosophical Quarterly 45(1995): 421-438.
• "Supervenience, Virtues and Consequences: A Commentary on Knowledge in Perspective by Ernest Sosa," Philosophical Studies 78 (1995):189-205.
• Charles B. Daniels, University of Victoria
• "A Theism-Free Cartesian Analysis of Knowledge," Noûs 33 (1999): 201-213
• Marian David, University of Notre Dame
• "Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 296-312.
• "Truth as the Epistemic Goal," in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty (Oxford UP, 2001)
• "Two Conceptions of the Synthetic A Priori," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (Open Court, 1997).
  
• Martin Davies, Australian National University
• "Externalism and Armchair Knowledge," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 384-414.
• "Self-Knowledge, Armchair Knowledge, and Knowledge by Inference," forthcoming, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. V, Epistemology.
• "Externalism, Architectuaralism, and Epistemic Warrant," in McDonald, Smith and Wright, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge (Oxford UP, 1998).
• Wayne A. Davis, Georgetown University
• "Concepts and Epistemic Individuation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 290-325.
  
• Michael DePaul, University of Notre Dame
• "Truth Consequentialism, Withholding and Proportioning Belief to the Evidence," Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 91-112.
• ed., with L. Zagzebski, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Clarendon Press, 2003.
• "Value Monism in Epistemology," in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Oxford UP, 2001.
• ed., Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism, Rowman and Littledfield, 2000.
  
• "Linguistics is Not a Good Model for Philosophy," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 113-120.
• ed., with W. Ramsey, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
• "Why Bother with Reflective Equilibrium?", DePaul, Ramsey, ed., Rethinking Intuition, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
• Graciela De Pierris, Indiana University
• "Philosophical Scepticism in Wittgenstein's On Certainty" in R. Popkin, ed., Scepticism in the History of Philosophy: A Pan-American Dialogue (Kluwer, 1996)
• Michael Della Rocca, Yale University
• "Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 1-33.
• Keith DeRose, Yale University
• "'Bamboozled by Our Own Words': Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  
• "Direct Warrant Realism," in A. Dole and A. Chignell, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 150-172.
  
• "The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 172-198.
• "Single Scoreboard Semantics," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 1-21.
• "Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 22-41.
• "The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (2004): 346-350.
• "Assertion, Knowledge and Context," Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 167-203.
• "Now You Know It, Now You Don't," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 91-106.
• "How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats?" The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
• "Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 697-706.
• "Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?" Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 385-413
• "Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 187-205.
• ed., with T. Warfield, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford UP, 1999).
• "Responding to Skepticism," in DeRose and Warfield, ed., Skepticism (1999), pp. 1-24.
• "Simple Might's, Indicative Possibilities, and the Open Future," The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 67-82.
• "Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 568-580.
• "Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): pp. 193-197.
• "Solving the Skeptical Problem," Philosophical Review 104 (1995): pp. 1-52.
• Michael Devitt, City University of New York, Graduate Center
• "No Place for the A Priori," forthcoming in M.J. Shaffer and M. Veber, eds., New Views of the A Priori in Physical Theory, Rodopi Press.
  
• "There Is no A Priori," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 105-115.
• "Underdetermination and Realism," Philosophical Issues 12 (2002): 26-50.
• "Naturalism and the A Priori," Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 45-65.
  
• Fred Dretske, Stanford University (emeritus)
• "The Case Against Closure," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 13-26.
• Perception, Knowledge, and Belief : Selected Essays (Cambridge UP, 2000).
• ed., with S. Bernecker, Knowledge : Readings in Contemporary Epistemology(Oxford UP, 2000).
• "Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 591-606.
• "The Mind's Awareness of Itself," Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 103-124.
• "Absent Qualia," Mind and Language 11 (1996): 78-85.
• "Phenomenal Externalism" and "Reply to Commentators, " in E. Villanueva, ed., Perception (Ridgeview, 1996)
• "Dretske's Awful Answer," Philosophia 24 (1995): 459-464.
• "Introspection," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1994): 263-278.
• Gary Ebbs, University of Illionois, Urbana
• "Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent?," Philosophical Studies 105 (2001): 43-58.
• Jim Edwards, University of Glasgow
• "Burge on Testimony and Memory," Analysis 60 (2000): 124-131.
• Catherine Elgin, Harvard University (School of Education)
• "Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 156-167.
• "Take It from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 291-308.
• Considered Judgment, Princeton UP, 1996.
• "Unnatural Science," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 289-302.
• Mylan Engel, Nothern Illinois University
• “Internalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (2000).
• Pascal Engel, University of Paris-Sorbonne
• "The Norms of Thought: Are They Social?," Mind and Society 2 (2002): 129-148.
• "Dispositional Belief, Assent and Acceptance," Dialectica 53 (1999): 211-226.
• "Volitionism and Voluntarism about Belief," in A. Meijers, ed., Belief, Cognition and the Will (Tilburg University Press, 1999), pp. pages 9-25.
• "Believing, Accepting, and Holding True," Philosophical Explorations 1 (1998).
  
• Theodore J. Everett, SUNY, Geneseo
• "The Rationality of Science and the Rationality of Faith," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 19-42.
• Simon Evnine, University of Miami
• "Epistemic Unities," Erkenntnis 59 (2003): 365-88.
  
• “The Universality of Logic: On the Connection between Rationality and Logical Ability,” Mind 110 (2001): 335-67
• "Learning from One's Mistakes: Epistemic Modesty and the Nature of Belief," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 157-177.
• “Believing Conjunctions,” Synthese 118 (1999): 201-227.
• Evan Fales, University of Iowa
• "Proper Basicality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 373-383.
• "Does Religion Experience Justify Religious Belief?: Do Mystics See God?" in M. Peterson, ed., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 145-158.
• critical study of Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, Nous 37 (2003): 353-370.
  
• A Defense of the Given, Rowman and Littlefield, 1996.
• "Mystical Experience as Evidence," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (1996): 19-46.
• "Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology," Philosophy of Science 63 (1996): 432-451.
• Kevin Falvey, University of California, Santa Barbara
• "Memory and Knowledge of Content", in S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT Press, 2003).
• "The Basis of First Person Authority," Philosophical Topics 28 (2000): 69-99.
  
• "Knowledge in Intention," Philosophical Studies 99 (2000): 21-44.
• "The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access," Analysis 60 (2000): 137-142.
• "A Natural History of Belief," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 324-345.
• Jeremy Fantl, University of Calgary
  
• with Matthew McGrath, "Knowledge and the Purely Epistemic: A Defense of Pragmatic Encroachment," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "An Analysis of the A Priori and A Posteriori," Acta Analytica 18 (2003): 43-69.
• "Modest Infinitism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 537-562.
  
• with Robert Howell, "Sensations, Swatches, and Speckled Hens," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 371-383.
  
• with Matthew McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification,” Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 67-94.
  
• Paul Faulkner, University of Sheffield
• "An Epistemic Role of Trust", in Falcone, Barber, Singh, and Korba, L., ed., Trust, Reputation and Security: Theories and Practice (Springer forthcoming).
• "On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony," Synthese 131 (2002): 353-370.
• "The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 581-601.
• "Testimonial Knowledge," Acta Analytica 15 (2000).
• "David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998).
• Neil Feit, SUNY, Fredonia
• "Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 29-55.
• Richard Feldman, University of Rochester
• "Justification Is Internal," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 270-284.
• with E. Conee, "Some Virtues of Evidentialism," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 95-108.
• with E. Conee, Evidentialism, Oxford UP, 2004.
• "Foundational Justification," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 42-58.
• with E. Conee, "Typing Problems" (a response to Adler and Levin's "Is the Generality Problem too General?"), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 98-105.
• "Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions," Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 61-85.
• with E. Conee, "Internalism Defended," American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 1-18.
• "Kvanvig on Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 43-50.
• "Epistemology, Argumentation, and Citizenship," forthcoming, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Vol. 3, pp. 89-106.
• "The Ethics of Belief," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 667-695.
• "Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 170-186.
• "Contextualism and Skepticism," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 91-114.
• with E. Conee, "The Generality Problem for Reliabilism," Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 1-29.
• "Plantinga, Gettier, and Warrant," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 199-220.
• "In Defense of Closure," Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 487-494.
• "Authoritarian Epistemology," Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 147-170.
• Hartry Field, New York University
• "Recent Debates about the A Priori," forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
• "Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle," Noûs 34 (2000): 1-30.
• "Apriority as an Evaluative Notion," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 117-149.
• "Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic," Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 1-24.
• "The A Prioricity of Logic," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 359-379.
• Kit Fine, New York University
• "Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects," forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005).
• Branden Fitelson, University of California, Berkeley
• “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation,” forthcoming, Synthese.
• with A. Waterman, “Bayesianism and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens,” forthcoming, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
• with Jim Hawthorne, “Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence, Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 505–514.
• “A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence,” Analysis 63 (2003): 194–199.
• with D. Bradley, “Monty Hall, Doomsday, and Confirmation,” Analysis 63 (2003): 23–31.
• “Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction,” Philosophy of Science 69 (2002): 611–622.
• with E. Eells, “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 129–142.
• with L. Bovens, S. Hartmann, J. Snyder, “Too Odd (not) to Be True? A Reply to Erik J. Olsson: ‘Corroborating Testimony,
  Probability and Surprise’,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002): 539–563.
• “A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications” Philosophy of Science 68 (2001): S123–40.
• with E. Eells, “Measuring Confirmation and Evidence,” Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 121–232.
• “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity,” Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): S362–78.
• with E. Sober, “Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998) 115–29. Reprinted in R. Pennock, ed., Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics, MIT Press.
• “Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity,” Philosophy of Science 63 (1996): 652–60.
  
• Robert Fogelin, Dartmouth College
• "Contextualism and Externalism: Trading in One Form of Skepticism for Another" (pp. 43-57) and "Replies [to Rosenberg, Villanueva, Valdes-Villanueva, and Williams]" (pp. 86-93), Philosophical Issues 10 (2000).
• "The Sceptic's Burden," International Journal of Philosophical Studies (1999): 159-172.
• "Garrett on the Consistency of Hume's Philosophy," Hume Studies 24 (1998): 161-169.
• "Quine's Limited Naturalism," Journal of Philosophy (1997): 543-563.
• "Prècis" (pp. 395-400) and "What Does a Pyrrhonist Know?" (replies to Dretske, Moser, Stroud, pp. 417-425); Symposium on R. Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997).
• Richard Foley, New York University
• "Justified Belief as Responsible Belief," in M. Steup and E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 313-326.
• "A Trial Separation between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 59-71.
• "Three Attempts to Refute Skepticism and Why They Fail" in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 61-73.
  
• Intellectual Trust in Ourselves and Others, Cambridge UP, 2001.
  
• "Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible Belief," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 181-188.
• "Locke and the Crisis of Postmodern Epistemology," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 1-20.
• "Rationality and Intellectual Self-Trust," in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, ed., Rethinking Intuition (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
• "Chisholm's Epistemology," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick Chisolm, Library of Living Philosophers (Open Court, 1997): 475-498.
• "Knowledge is Accurate and Comprehensive Enough True Belief," in J. Kvanvig ed., Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 87-95.
• Graeme Forbes, University of Colorado, Boulder
  
• "Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 205-222.  Reprinted in Skepticism (DeRose and Warfield, 1999).
• Bryan Frances, Fordham University
• Scepticism Comes Alive, forthcoming, Oxford UP, 2005.
• "When a Sceptical Hypothesis is Live," Noûs 39 (2005): 559-595.
  
• "A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription," Analysis 62 (2002): 116-124.
• "Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles," Mind and Language 14 (1999): 203-226.
  
• Elizabeth Fricker, Oxford University
• "Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism is the Epistemology of Testimony," Mind 104 (1995): 393-411.
• Michael Friedman, Indiana University
• "Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge: A Neo-Kantian Perspective," in Boghossian, Peacocke, ed., New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 367-383.
• Richard Fumerton, University of Iowa
• "The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 85-97.
• "Achieving Epistemic Ascent," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 72-85.
• "Mill's Epistemology and Metaphysics" in The Modern Philosophers: From Descartes to Nietzche (Blackwell, forthcoming).
• "Epistemic Justification and Normativity," in M. Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Obligation: Essays on Epistemic Responsibility and the Ethics of Belief, (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
• "Classical Foundationalism" and "Response" in M. DePaul, ed., Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism (Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).
• "Relational, Non-Relational, and Mixed Theories of Experience," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V, Epistemology: 21-28.
• "Williamson on Skepticism and Evidence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 629-635.
• "Externalism and Epistemological Direct Realism," The Monist 81 (1998): 393- 406.
• Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
• "Prècis" (pp. 905-907) and "A Reply to my Critics" (pp. 927-938), Symposium on R. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998).
• André Gallois, Syracuse University
• "The Indubitability of the Cogito," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 363-384.
• The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority, Cambridge UP, 1996
• with John Hawthorne, "Externalism and Scepticism," Philosophical Studies 81 (1996): 1-26, January 1996.
• Alfonso Garcia Suarez, Universidad de Oviedo
• "On Wright's Diagnosis of McKinsey's Argument," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 164-171.
• Tamar Szabo Gendler, Yale University
  
• ed., with J. Hawthorne, Perceptual Experience (Oxford UP, 2006).
  
• with J. Hawthorne, "The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for your Epistemic Enemies," Philosophical Studies 124 (2005): 331-352.
  
• "Thought Experiments Rethought -- and Reperceived," Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 1152-1163.
  
• "On the Relation Between Pretense and Belief," in D.M. Lopes and M. Kieran, ed., Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts, (Routledge, 2003), pp. 125-141.
• ed., with J. Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002).
• “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” The Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 55-81.
• Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases, Outstanding Dissertations in Philosophy, Garland Press (now Routledge), 2000. (70,000 words)
• "Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1998): 397-424.
• "On the Possibility of Feminist Epistemology," Metaphilosophy 27 (1996): 104-117.
• Brie Gertler, University of Virginia
  
• “We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know that water does?”, Analysis, 64 (2004) : 44-47
  
• ed., Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (Ashgate, 2003).
• “Can Feminists be Cartesians?”, Dialogue 41 (2002): 91-112.
• "Introspecting Phenomenal States," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 305-328.
• "The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge," Philosophical Topics 28 (2001): 125-46.
• Edmund Gettier, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
• John Gibbons, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
• "Access Externalism," Mind 115 (2006): 19-39.
  
• "Knowledge in Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 579-600.
• "Externalism and Knowledge of the Attitudes," Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 13-28.
• "Externalism and Knowledge of Content," Philosophical Review 105 (1996): 287-310.
• Anthony Gillies, University of Michigan
• "New Foundations for Epistemic Change," Synthese. 138 (2004): 1-48.
  
• "Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics," Noûs 38 (2004): 585-615.
• "A New Solution to Moore's Paradox," Philosophical Studies 105 (2001):  237-250.
• "Belief Revision and Epistemology" (with John Pollock), Synthese 122 (2000): 69-92.
• Carl Ginet, Cornell University (emeritus)
• "Infinitism Is not the Solution to the Regress Problem," in M. Steup, E. Sosa, ed., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 140-149.
• "The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 267-277.
  
• Sanford Goldberg, University of Kentucky
• editor, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, forthcoming, Oxford UP.
• "Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification," forthcoming, Noûs.
• "Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discrimination," forthcoming, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
• with D. Henderson, "Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony," forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• "Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge," forthcoming in J. Lackey and E. Sosa, eds., The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford UP).
• "Testimonial Knowledge from Unsafe Testimony," Analysis 65 (2005): 302-311.
• "The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2005): 135-148.
• "(Non-standard) Lessons from World-Switching Cases," Philosophia 32 (2005): 95-131.
• "Radical Interpretation, Understanding, and Testimonial Transmission," Synthese 138 (2004): 387-416.
• "Anti-individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism," Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 53-78.
• "On our Alleged A Priori Knowledge that Water Exists," Analysis 63 (2003): 38-41.
  
• "What Do You Know When You Know Your Own Thoughts?," in S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 241-56.
• "Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of the Attitudes Capture the Agents' Conceptions?," Noûs 36 (2002): 597-621.
  
• "Belief and Its Linguistic Expression: Towards a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority," Philosophical Psychology 15 (2002): 65-76
• "Testimonially Based Knowledge From False Testimony," Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 512-526
• "Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy," Philosophical Studies 100 (2000): 51-79.
• "The Semantics of Interlocution," Communication and Cognition 33 (2000): 249-286
• "The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999): 136-156.
• "The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge," Synthese 118 (1999): 165-199.
• "Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Knowledge of Content: Reply to Brueckner," Analysis 59 (1999): 212-217.
• "Self-Ascription, Self-Knowledge, and t